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FINANCIAL REGULATION							G A WALKER

Financial markets are mechanisms or processes for the sale and purchase of financial assets or allocation of credit or capital more generally within the economy. Despite their value and advantage, markets must be subject to some form or level of oversight and control. Financial markets carry out a number of essential services although the importance of these functions and the inherent instability of the markets is generally considered sufficient to justify some public intervention and control.

The meaning and nature of the most appropriate level of financial regulation nevertheless remains unclear. The recent crises in financial markets have called for further controls to be imposed in light of the losses suffered and damage inflicted across the economy. Significant disagreement nevertheless remains with regard to the proper degree and scope of regulatory intervention required. 

Financial regulation has had to be adjusted in response to the significant changes that have occurred in national and international financial markets. These have specifically involved the domestic and cross-border expansion of many activities, deregulation and liberalisation, associated capital mobility, supporting technological improvement especially in computer and telecommunication delivery and continuous financial innovation and integration with the breakdown of the distinctions between the traditional financial sectors of banking, securities and insurance. Regulatory systems are still based on authorisation, continuing supervision, enforcement, restructuring or closure and compensation with the core regulatory tools remaining the carrying out of initial suitability assessments, the maintenance of capital and liquidity reserves, effective internal systems and controls, regular reporting and inspection and sanction as necessary. These more traditional models have nevertheless had to be reviewed and extended over time in light of the significant changes that have taken place in market structure and practice.

A series of new ‘regulatory debates’ has since arisen as authorities have attempted to construct a new ‘regulatory agenda’. Reform has focused on regulatory structure (including the creation of ‘single regulators’ as well as single regulation or law and the creation of ‘single markets’ with the European Union), regulatory models (using either authorisation, approval, recognition, registration or simpler notification systems), and regulatory source (with regulation being either imposed by law, ‘rules’ and guidance as well as ‘principles’ in addition to underlying administrative discretion, decision and action). The objectives of financial regulation have also become considerably more complex moving from more traditional financial stability and consumer protection programmes to include a larger number of goals such as consumer confidence, education and protection and market efficiency, competition and innovation as well as larger financial crime, ethics and welfare contribution. A number of further areas have also required specific examination such as with regard to the proper degree of regulatory reliance placed on internal market and firm capability, governance and, in particular, the role and function of non-executive board directors, incentives and remuneration, regulatory and market support and ultimate welfare benefit and redistribution. A whole series of new challenges have arisen that have to be addressed through appropriate financial regulatory revision going forward.

Recent events in national and international markets have further confirmed that regulatory policy cannot be considered in isolation. Regulatory and monetary policy must be managed together more effectively while financial stability policy appears to have been ignored within the regulatory restructuring that has taken place in recent years. Reference has already been made to the importance of consumer protection policy and economic policy more generally in terms of market growth and development. Additional issues also arise with regard to competition policy and the destabilising effects of over-competitive markets and to fiscal policy in terms of the allocation of the costs of market failure and support especially where large parts of the financial industry have to be refinanced and recapitalised at public expense. All of these core areas of government or public policy must be considered together.

A significant number of papers have been issued on regulatory reform following the recent financial crises at the national, European and international levels, including within the US and UK. These have involved looking at the institutional structure of regulation and more specific detailed regulatory content and obligations. The Financial Stability Board (FSB) has issued a number of reform papers with the Basel Committee completing its Basel III calibration and amendments during 2010. The US has created a Financial Crisis Committee, continued with its Troubled Asset Recovery Program (TARP) operations, established a Financial Services Oversight Board (FSOB), conducted various other enquiries including of GS and other financial executives, as well as complete negotiations on a 1,500 financial services reform legislative package. The UK had adopted two bailout packages for its major banks in October 2008 and January 2009, enacted the Banking Act 2009 and Financial Services Act 2010, created an external Council for Financial Stability (CFS) and then replaced this with a new Bank of England internal Financial Policy Committee (FPC) and announced the break up of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and transfer of course regulatory function back to the Bank of England with the creation of a separate  Consumer Protection and Markets Authority (CPMA) and Economic Crime Agency (ECA). The US imposed an earlier crisis penalty on the banks with the UK confirming that it would proceed with a £2bn annual levy despite wider G20 and EU agreement. All of this has significant implications on the development and emergence of regulatory policy at this time.

The purpose of this paper is to consider the meaning and structure of financial regulation in modern markets. Relevant key terms are initially defined. The advantages of financial intermediation are reviewed and the possible associated risks and exposures that arise outlined. The nature of risk within each of the core financial sectors of banking, securities and insurance is contrasted and the importance of financial stability highlighted. Modern financial theory in terms of the arguments for and against regulatory intervention is reviewed with all of the complex regulatory objectives that arise. A basic regulatory model is constructed with the additional issues that arise then being considered in terms of cross-border market access and global supervisory relationships. Final comments and conclusions are drawn on the structure and relevance of the new regulatory agenda emerging at this time.

1.	FINANCIAL MARKETS, LAW AND REGULATION









Supervision refers to the associated or complementary process of monitoring or reviewing compliance by banks and other financial institutions with any specific sets of regulatory provisions imposed or with more general standards of prudent or proper behaviour in any particular market or in relation to any specific service.​[4]​ Supervision is an oversight, monitoring or compliance function. This necessarily assumes the existence of applicable regulatory provisions while the control component within regulation implies the existence of an appropriate compliance mechanism. 

Historically, supervision may also be understood to include the more general monitoring or oversight of the stability and efficient operation of banks or banking and financial markets either before any specific statutory regulation was imposed or in addition to any relevant statutory provisions.​[5]​ This would correspond with the more general oversight role taken by the Bank of England in the UK before the creation of a statutory banking authorisation system under the Banking Act 1979 and then Banking Act 1987.​[6]​





Finance law is the law of finance or the law of financial assets and financial claims. It is the law of financial rights which include rights in rem to financial assets (such as gold, coinage or other financial instruments) and rights in personam relating to pure intangibles or choses in action. Personal tangible property then includes such financial assets as documents of title for the payment of money (financial instruments)​[9]​ and documents of title to transferable securities.​[10]​ Financial (rather than finance) law includes financial regulation.​[11]​ These controls may either be imposed by laws, secondary instruments, rules (and guidance), principles or administrative action or discretion.​[12]​

(d)	 Financial Law 

Financial law is concerned with the structure and operation of financial markets and financial systems more generally. This then examines the results of the use or application of finance instruments or mechanisms or with the larger context or environment within which financial assets are used or applied. Financial law is then principally concerned with financial markets or the larger financial systems within which financial assets and markets operate. This can include a number of aspects of governance and control such as with regard to market entry (and exit), structure and operation, conduct on the market, common market functions (including as initial price disclosure, dealing or trading, clearing and settlement​[13]​) as well as oversight, sanction or enforcement and dispute settlement.

(e)	Law and Economics 

Financial law and regulation have also to be distinguished from the ‘law and economics’ school in the social sciences which has attempted to bridge law and economics studies. Modern law and economics is considered to date from Ronald Coase’s seminal paper on ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ in 1960 and Richard Posner’s Economic Analysis of Law in 1972.​[14]​ The relationship between law and economics can nevertheless be dated to the earlier works of the Scottish Enlightenment writers including David Hume, Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith.​[15]​ 





Banks and other financial institutions act as financial intermediaries within the economy. Intermediation operates by matching or linking excess with deficit capacity elements with financial intermediation bringing entities of people together holding surplus financial assets (cash or claims) with those with deficit assets requiring funding in some form. The basic function of a bank is to receive or collect funds from depositors and then pool these and on-lend them to borrowers. Two separate debt obligations are then created with the bank initially acting as a debtor to the depositor and then creditor to the borrower. Financial intermediation creates wealth by increasing the total amount of assets and liabilities in the economy.​[20]​

Banks provide two core services in the form of deposit (savings) and credit (loan) using pooled deposited funds. Depositors may also direct moneys to be paid to third parties with banks then carrying out a third core function in terms of payment or managing the payment system. Payment may either be made through coinage or banknotes as well as bills of exchange and cheques or new electronic forms of funds transfer. Banks then add additional value in providing longer securities, higher expected returns, lower risk of default and transaction costs and increased security​[21]​. In acting as financial intermediaries, banks also carry out a number of further ancillary but important services in connection with credit assessment, risk management and information provision​[22]​. Deposit intermediation then allows for the aggregation of savings and lending, transformation of maturities and management and distribution of risk with low transaction costs and a high degree of transaction security. All of this facilitates increased production, commerce and consumption which increase overall wealth within the economy through earnings and taxation.

3.	FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND SECTORS





The origins of banking are considered to date from the activities of the Italian merchants and financial families during the 13th and 14th centuries in Lombardy, Florence, Venice, Genoa and other northern City states. Early financiers would sit on a bench or ‘banco’ to conduct business. Many early practices including double-entry bookkeeping and the issuance of receipts repayable at different branches nevertheless originated with the Knights Templar in the 12th century.​[23]​ The first private bank was the Monte de Paschi in Siena in 1472 with the first public clearing bank being the Casa de San Giorgio in Genoa in 1407. 

Early forms of international finance were taken forward with the growth of the Great Fairs which again originated in the northern Italian towns but subsequently spread to other medieval merchant cities as Bruges, Lyons and Antwerp.​[24]​ Early practices were accordingly trade or ‘merchant banking’ based and involved money-changing, lending and dealing in early forms of bills of exchange.​[25]​ Modern merchant and investment banking then still involves the provision of trade finance through bills of exchange or letters of credit with electronic funds transfer as well as assisting governments and companies raise funds through the capital markets with the issuance of bonds (or debentures) and equity as well as other clearing, corporate advisory or asset management services.​[26]​

English banking developed in the 17th century out of the activities of scriveners (notaries), jewellers and lapidaries (who work with precious stones).​[27]​ Goldsmiths were able to accept valuable items for storage or custody while scriveners were able to write, negotiate or broker bills or loans and accept deposits.​[28]​ Goldsmiths and scriveners were then able to lend against funds deposited keeping a reserve to cover withdrawals. Paper money can be considered to date from the promissory notes issued by these embryonic private banks and later by the Bank of England which was set up in 1694​[29]​. The Bank of England was given a monopoly right on note issuance under the Bank Charter Act in 1844 although the rights of original issuance of Scottish and Northern Irish banks were protected.​[30]​

The ‘art’ of banking has then always been to balance the bank’s funding liabilities against its lending commitments. Banks source themselves short but lend medium to long term which creates an inherent ‘maturity mismatch’ as a result of the ‘maturity transformation’ process carried out. Banks fund themselves short historically through retail or corporate deposits alone with a typical reserve of up to one-third being kept with the balance being on-lent.​[31]​ Following the emergence of highly liquid secondary markets beginning in the UK at the end of the 1950s, banks were able to draw down increasingly large amounts of short-term wholesale funding from other banks.​[32]​ A number of banks including specifically Northern Rock and Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) faced difficulties during 2007 and 2008 following the drying up of credit on these inter-bank markets as their business models were increasingly based on larger volumes of wholesale rather than underlying deposit covered lending.​[33]​

Banking markets are inherently unstable in light of this maturity mismatch as the borrowed funds are committed to medium to long term loans. A bank’s balance sheet largely consists of a ‘loan book’ of essentially illiquid assets supported by demand deposits or short-term wholesale funding. Banks retain a certain reserve to cover anticipated and unanticipated withdrawal demands.​[34]​ The difficulty that may arise is that a specific bank’s reserves may be exhausted with the bank being forced either to raise further funds from other banks or from the central bank as lender of last resort (LLR)​[35]​. Under traditional LLR theory, central banks generally lend to illiquid but solvent banks at penal rates (to limit excessive risk-taking and moral hazard) and only to insolvent and illiquid banks where the bank’s collapse may threaten the stability of other institutions and the stability of the financial system as a whole. The liquidity difficulties experienced by a bank may be transferred to other banks either through actual default on inter-bank commitments or through a separate run by depositors on the second bank. Where this contagion (or domino) effect is sufficiently severe, this may create a full systems or systemic threat.

If a bank experiences difficulty, it will attempt to dispose of any liquid assets including other loan securities or high quality corporate debt. The bank’s principal asset is its loan book although this cannot be closed immediately without breach of the contractual terms of all of the separate commitments involved. The loan book is transferable through assignment although a purchaser will insist on a discount as it will not be able to undertake the same credit assessments as the first bank on the individual counter party exposures involved. The loan book in some cases may only be able to sold at a substantial discount or ‘fire sale’.





Securities began with the first transferable public debts issued in Venice in the 12th century and then with the Monte Commune long-term municipal traded in Florence from the 1300s onwards. Tradable life annuities were introduced into the Netherlands in 1542 with the first stock exchange having been set up in Antwerp in 1460. Stock markets were also set up in Lyons in 1540, Hamburg in 1558 and Amsterdam in 1602 with the first organised exchange in Paris in 1724. London merchants began to meet at coffeehouses including specifically Jonathan’s Coffeehouse from 1760 to purchase interest in overseas shipping and other trading ventures. Jonathan’s subsequently became the Stock Exchange in 1773 with a deed of settlement in 1802. Dealers began to buy and sell shares at 22 Wall Street from 1792 with the New York Stock Exchange and Board being set up in 1817 and an earlier market in Philadelphia in 1790.​[37]​ 

The principal risk that arises in the securities markets is that the value of the stock traded may raise or fall which is referred to as ‘position’ or ‘market’ risk. Credit risk is of less concern as securities are bought and sold and rarely held to maturity. The same difficulties of maturity transformation do not arise as in banking as the securities are inherently transferable and funded through capital or short-term subordinated debt or other borrowings rather than deposits. Firms can always raise liquidity through the disposal of securities at any time. Forced or immediate sales may generate losses although these are borne by shareholders and bondholders rather than depositors as with banks. Profits are generated through the purchase and sale of securities rather than on the margin between the cost of funds and lending in banking​[38]​. Where firms deal as brokers on behalf of clients, further protection is provided through the use of segregated cash and securities accounts.





The primary concern that arises with regard to insurance firms is with regard to the long-term stability of the invested funds held to ensure sufficient liquidity to cover continuing payment commitments. Insurance funds are exposed to mark or position risk on the securities held although these are often managed by professional asset managers with strict rules being imposed with regard to the composition of the portfolio to ensure that it provides a stable but not necessarily high yielding return. Funds are required to hold sufficient levels of technical reserves to cover outstanding underwriting commitments and separate solvency margins against short-term fluctuations in asset values and trading losses. Local asset matching obligations may also be opposed to ensure that necessary funds are available to cover local commitments​[42]​.





The activities of different types of financial intermediaries create distinct types of risk. All of these risks have to be managed in practice to ensure the operational efficiency of markets and to protect financial stability at all times. One of the key policy issues that has to be determined is the extent to which these exposures can be left to be dealt with by financial institutions using their own internal control systems and risk management processes or whether specific regulatory limits or controls have to be imposed. The related issue is then the extent to which financial supervision should be limited only to confirming that firms have adequate internal facilities for this purpose or the extent to which the authorities should ensure that all core risks are in fact managed effectively either directly through firm supervision or more general market oversight. The related institutional issue that arises is which authority or authorities should be responsible for overall financial stability and how this should be managed in practice.​[45]​

All businesses have to manage a certain amount of risk depending on the nature of the activities concerned and their possible geographic location. These generally include such factors as management risk, supply risk, technological risk, political and legal risk or other environmental risks. Risk management becomes of even more importance in the financial area with institutions having to manage both specific internal risks generated by their activities as well as the more general business risks that all firms have to control. The further difficulty that arises is that the financial risks generated by banks and other financial intermediaries can be sufficiently large that this can threaten both the stability of the immediate financial institution as well the localised sector concerned and the financial system or economy as a whole. It is for this reason that regulatory authorities must ensure that financial institutions manage all relevant risks effectively and that appropriate support operations are in place where necessary.





Financial risk can be understood to refer to the risk of loss arising from any particular financial transaction or on any specific type of financial instrument or contract. The specific exposures that can arise will depend on the specific activity concerned. The five principal financial risks are as follows:

(a)	Credit or counter party default risk refers to the risk of non-payment of interest during the term of a loan and/or non-repayment of principal on maturity;
(b)	Market or position risk is the risk of loss on the fluctuation in the value of a debt or equity stock quoted on a formal market or sold on a secondary exchange including over-the-counter (OTC);
(c)	Foreign exchange or currency risk (or FX risk) is the risk of loss on the variation in the price of one currency as against another;​[46]​
(d)	Interest rate risk is the risk from exposure on movements in interest rates (which, in particular, includes price risk, pre-payment risk, reinvestment risk and extension risk);​[47]​
(e)	Financial derivatives related risks​[48]​ and commodity related risks.​[49]​





Operational risks are concerned with failure in internal systems and controls and other business operations​[57]​. These are not concerned with exposures arising from the nature of the financial instruments involved but from the firm’s more general systems or processes that create these instruments. Operating or operational risks principally arise in connection with:

(a)	Internal or external fraud;
(b)	Personnel failure; or
(c)	Systems defect or failure.





Legal risk is concerned with the legal validity and enforceability of contractual documents. Three specific forms of legal risk can be identified:





Ensuring that no legal risks arise is the responsibility of the legal advisors to any particular transactions. Where a breach may have occurred, it may still be possible to rely on an available exemption or ‘safe harbour’ (such as those provided by the UK FSA under the MAR sourcebook on market abuse)​[67]​. Where residual concerns may arise, some form of ‘no-action letter’ may be sought from the relevant authority such as from the SEC in the US on securities matters. The US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) may also exempt certain OTC commodity swaps under a safe harbour provision.

(d)	Business or Management Risks

Business risks may also be considered to include such elements as reputation risk​[68]​ or group risk.​[69]​ A number of more general business or management risks may also be identified. Business risk refers to the non-performance of a specific business strategy or the failure of a business more generally. This can also be more specifically understood to refer to the inability of a firm to cover ongoing operating expenditures or commitments.

Management risk refers more specifically to difficulties arising as a result of management failures. This can be considered to constitute a form of personnel risk although this tends to be understood more narrowly to include employees or agents. Other business risks include economic risk​[70]​ and strategic risk.​[71]​

(e)	External or Environmental Risks





The crises in financial markets during 2007-2009 have drawn necessary attention to the importance of financial stability and the need to attempt to manage this effectively. Unfortunately, the meaning of the terms ‘financial stability’ are unclear with related terms such as financial instability, financial crises and other forms of disruption or scandal also being unclear and unspecified.​[76]​ There is also no agreement on the stages or phases, cause, impact or necessary measures require to prevent financial instability or financial crises from arising.​[77]​ 

Financial stability and instability more generally can be understood in terms of market function or operation. Financial stability would refer to the condition under which markets can continue to discharge their core functions on an ongoing basis without major disruption or significant additional cost with financial instability being the inability to do so.​[78]​ Financial instability then refers to the inability of a market to carry out their core functions for any extended period. 

A financial crisis may be understood to refer to any major or significant interference or disruption to the stability, operation or value of a financial market or system.​[79]​ A financial crisis may lead to financial instability although financial instability may not necessarily follow from a specific crisis depending upon how generally the term crisis is defined.​[80]​ A banking crisis more specifically may include any suspension of payment or convertibility of deposits, a significant withdrawal of funds over a short period (a bank run), a forced acquisition or restructuring, the provision of lender of last resort assistance or closure. The required degree of disruption may be defined in quantitative terms with specific limits being imposed on such measures as inflation, currency values or stock market prices although difficulties necessarily arise in agreeing specific figures.​[81]​ Quantitative definitions may nevertheless be of less value and importance for policy and response purposes. 

Financial disruption would include any other temporary or short-term loss of functionality. A bank panic may be considered to include a run on one bank or more than one bank. A scandal, in contrast, is concerned with loss, regulatory breach or other malpractice within a single institution or a common incidence across different institutions not threatening the stability of the entities themselves or the market as a whole. Financial fragility includes any pre-crisis condition within which markets become susceptible to crisis, disruption or instability. This would include a ‘mania’ which can be understood in terms of a collective speculative excess or herding. A ‘crash’ would include any sharp fall in asset prices including stock market quotes.

Instability and crisis can also be distinguished from subsequent economic conditions including specifically a recession or depression. A recession is defined to include a fall in a country’s GDP over, at least, two financial quarters.​[82]​ A depression is a sustained, severe economic downturn resulting in lower production and investment, credit contraction, unemployment and insolvency with reduced international trade and possible currency instability, devaluation and collapse.​[83]​ Recessions can be considered to be cyclic and manageable while depressions are abnormal and severe creating negative reinforcing effects that are difficult to interrupt​[84]​.

An asset price, economic or speculative bubble involves the purchase and sale of assets at excessive values not tied to their intrinsic or historic market value which generally end (burst) follow a significant reversal in expectation, collapse and confidence. ​[85]​ A ‘mania’ refers to the pre-collapse phase during which asset prices rise.​[86]​ 

Financial instability may be considered to arise from a number of causes. The most common elements would appear to be speculation and rising asset price expectation, accompanied by credit and monetary expansion, excessive debt or leverage, asset price escalation and then collapse and consequent credit contraction and de-leveraging with a transfer of wealth to cash or other safe and liquid investments such as government bonds.​[87]​ Adam Smith had specifically warned to the dangers of ‘over-trading’ with other writers referring to ‘flaws’ in the credit system.​[88]​ Other commentators have claimed that early errors and excesses were corrected with the evolution of more sophisticated modern markets during the 19th century.​[89]​ This nevertheless ignores the destabilising effects that human expectation and rational or irrational behaviour or choice can have on market instability. There is an unfortunate tendency for even the most modern of economic analysis to ignore the distorting effects of expectation in market conditions.​[90]​

Markets can generally either be considered to be inherently stable or unstable. This stability approach is based on ‘efficient market theory’​[91]​ and ‘rational expectations theory’.​[92]​ Instability writers hold that markets are inherently fragile and prone to collapse. Hyman Minsky maintains that capitalist markets developed through natural phases of shock (or ‘displacement’). Speculation (and ‘euphoria’).​[93]​ Markets turn (during ‘financial distress’) and then collapse. Minsky’s work has been supported by other writers​[94]​ and explains many elements of the recent financial crises in 2007 and 2008. High levels of cheap liquidity led to speculation in many asset classes which was only halted with the freezing of inter-bank credit between August 2007 and August 2008. Concerns with the solvency of banks and other major financial institutions led to a collapse in their share prices and then stock markets more generally in September/October 2008 which brought on the global recession aggravated by the contraction in credit within the financial markets. This forced central banks to provide additional liquidity to the system on a last resort basis.​[95]​





Financial instability can explained in terms of the need to correct asset price bubbles (based on expectation and speculation, credit, leverage, price collapse and contraction) or other economic cycles and financial risk.​[99]​ The justification for financial regulation has not, however, been tied directly to any of these factors and has often been imprecise and uncertain historically.​[100]​ The regulation debate has generally assumed that markets should be allowed to operate freely insofar as possible with intervention only be imposed where justified and necessary.​[101]​ Any strict correspondence between the specific regulatory need and particular type of control involved may nevertheless often be lacking. 

Further difficulties may also arise where separate objectives are imposed on regulators.​[102]​ Care has to be taken to ensure that financial regulation continues to be justified on a clear and necessary basis. Each wider objective must be justified in terms of need and cannot simply be assumed. Where a number of parallel objectives are imposed which may either conflict or, at least, difficult to reconcile, authorities must be able to prioritise them in accordance with clear and accepted principles.​[103]​





Early public interest arguments were developed in the US to justify the imposition of state or federal regulation on otherwise unregulated industries or utilities which were otherwise protected under the ‘Free Commerce’ clause in the US Constitution.​[104]​ Early US debate on the justification and scope of regulation was concerned with a competitive market model based Adam Smith’s ‘Invisible Hand’​[105]​ and the extent to which federal or state controls could be imposed on Constitutional protected rights. The private market model did not strictly apply in connection with public utilities or the public sector. 

The 5th and 14th Amendment provided that, ‘No State shall … deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law’. The Supreme Court held that this protected freedom of contract but only outside a narrow range of industries considered to be ‘peculiarly and sufficiently clothed’ or ‘affected with a public interest’ to justify control. This was extended to include banks in 1911 in Noble State Bank v Haskell.​[106]​ 

The Supreme Court then held in the leading case of Nebbia v New York in 1934 and abandoned the former distinction between any narrow class of controllable industries and other areas of private contact and held that any type of activity may be subject to economic regulation where this was justified in the public interest.​[107]​ The only condition was that the laws were not arbitrary or discriminatory under the due process requirements imposed under the Constitution.​[108]​ Federal and state regulation was accordingly justified on the basis of the ‘general good’ or ‘public welfare’. Other specific arguments justifying intervention included protecting customers from private monopoly exploitation or from unregulated competition which was regarded as being excessive.​[109]​ 

(b)	Public Choice and Regulatory Capture

Earlier public interest justifications for financial regulation were criticised by leading US economists during the late 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. This focused on public choice and ‘regulatory capture’ with financial regulation being perceived as being inherently restrictive, distortionary and anti-competitive. Writers such as Ronald Coase and George Stigler criticised the ‘political calculus’ with regulatory authorities being ‘captured’ and regulation serving only the industries rather than the public interest.​[110]​





Following the rejection of earlier more general public interest theories, financial regulation is now justified either on the basis of regulatory failure or particular market imperfections, defects or default. Some writers maintain that markets can still work effectively and attribute crisis and market failure to regulatory effects.​[115]​ While this partly restates earlier efficient market theory,​[116]​ the emphasis is on regulatory distortion, excess and failure and the need for financial regulation to protect rat her than undermine market function and operation. This could also be extended to include Louis Brandeis’s concern with the damage that excessive competition can cause.​[117]​  

Other writers identify specific defects in an assumed perfect market model with regulation being targeted at correcting the particular defect identified. Early formulations consisted of dealing with natural monopolies, information problems and potential systemic instability​[118]​ with other factors being added subsequently.​[119]​ Financial regulation only then operates on a minimal pr default basis to the extent necessary to correct specifc market failure. The most relevant current factors may be summarised in terms of systemic instability, monopolies, information asymmetry or default as well as depositor protection more generally and now uncertainty or unpredictability. Financial regulation may then justified on a collapse (stability), competition (monopoly), conflict (information), consumer, or certainty basis.
 
(i)	Systemic Failure and Externality

The principal justification for financial regulation is the need to limit the danger of systemic collapse and other externalities. Externalities arise where additional losses are created not borne by market counterparties or other loss creators.​[120]​ Banking markets are inherently unstable due to the maturity mismatch or transformation involved in funding medium to long term loan books on the basis of short term deposits with the additional risk that the collapse of one bank may threaten the stability of other entities through contagion (or domino). Where this contagion is sufficiently severe, it can threaten the stability of the financial system or systemic stability as a whole.​[121]​ 
Financial regulation can also be justified on the basis of the need to limit the moral hazard that would arise with financial institutions undertaking excess risk with the availability of LLR support and with depositors failing to exercise any control due to their reliance on deposit protection.​[122]​ The threat of systemic collapse is dealt with through central bank lender of last resort (LLR) and deposit protection.​[123]​ The availability of LLR and depositor protection can be considered to create moral hazard and additional risk of loss with bank management being able to rely on the provision of LLR and depositors not having to exercise any oversight or discipline over management with the availability of deposit cover.​[124]​ 

Financial regulation is then justified on the basis of the need to compensate for this moral hazard and limit loss claims arising under LLR or deposit protection. This is specifically considered to be the main need for capital adequacy which allows banks to absorb a certain amount of loss before insolvency and closure.​[125]​ Particular types of regulation are also imposed to limit the assumption of risk by market counterparties such as with regard to the imposition of initial suitability (fit and proper) obligations on key personnel, the maintenance of effect risk management systems and other more specific regulatory obligations such as in connection with large exposures (individual borrower) and concentration limits.

Regulation may also be justified on the basis of financial firms acting in a common or collective basis in a manner detrimental to consumers.​[126]​ This can be considered to be part of the systemic failure argument or separately. Further problems arise in ensuring effective oversight of markets. While principal agent conflicts arise between financial firms and their customers,​[127]​ customers will, in practice, delegate oversight or monitoring to central authorities​[128]​ while the authorities must also support the stability of the market as a whole and prevent systemic collapse. This may either be considered to constitute a separate justification for regulation or more accurately an argument for centralised rather than delegated regulation once the need for regulation has been substantiated.









Information asymmetries necessarily arise in the financial services area as the professional service provider will always have more information than the recipient of the service or customer. Further difficulties also arise in terms of conflicts of interest where the service provider acts as agent on behalf of the client (or more than one client) and as principal on their own account.​[134]​ While similar issues arise with regard to the provision of any other type of professional service, financial products and services can be considered to be distinct in a number of particular respects.​[135]​ 




Regulation can separately be justified on the basis of more general consumer protection or more particular depositor (banking), investor (securities), policy holder (insurance) or other particular service recipients basis. This is often considered to be sufficient justification by itself with the specific grounds for intervention often being left unspecified. This can nevertheless be justified on the basis of the financial loss suffered​[140]​ in the event of the collapse of a specific financial institution as well as on the basis of the information problems identified.​[141]​ 

While banking markets are prone to systemic threats (which may not of themselves justify authorisation or licensing), securities markets involve substantial conflicts of interest which do justify entry controls. Significant levels of conflicts of interest can arise where securities firms deal or otherwise act as agent and principal and as agent for multiple clients with a series of the vertical and horizontal sets of potential conflicts arising. It is principally for this reason that securities markets are subject to conduct of business rules which impose additional obligations on such matters as best advice, best execution, suitability, client segregation and expressed anti-conflicts provisions.​[142]​ Banks are not subject to the same obligations as they generally deal only as principal with bank customer relationships being dealt with either under the common law or such non-statutory provisions such as the Code of Banking Practice issued in the UK.​[143]​

Consumer protection regulation in the financial area can also be justified on the basis of the need to response to consumer demand​[144]​ and to maintain consumer confidence.​[145]​ While consumer may be considered to constitue an extension of consumer protection, consumer confidence can be considered an aspect of depositor protection, systemic stability or even uncertainty. Recent events in financial markets have confirmed the need to ensure minimum levels of confidence. 

(v)	Uncertainty and Network Effects

Arguments based on uncertainty or irrationality can also be developed to justify financial regulation. This has become of particular importance following the recent crises as regulatory agencies and commentators have questioned earlier assumptions with regard to efficient and rational markets.​[146]​ While efficient markets and rational choice theory had become of importance during the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s,​[147]​ many of the assumptions on which this was based are now being questioned as regulatory authorities reassess their role and function.​[148]​ More specific criticisms have also been made of the assumed value of securitisation,​[149]​ modern risk management theory and practice,​[150]​ market discipline​[151]​ and financial innovation more generally.​[152]​

It can be argued that it was the collapse in general market confidence that led to the steep decline in stock market prices in September and October 2008 which triggered the following global recession. Market confidence had been included as an expressed statutory objective of the FSA within s2(1)(a) FSMA in the UK​[153]​ although its importance and relevance during the recent crisis could to have been predicted. Ensuring that minimum proper market standards are maintained at all times under some form of formal regulation may also be considered to be a necessary expectation or demand within more sophisticated financial markets. Regulation may then simply result from lobby groups or Parliamentary pressure. 

Market default can no longer simply be understood in terms of externality and systemic failure, monopolies and cartels or information correction as well as the effects of these failures on individual consumers. The recent crises have confirmed that financial markets considerably more complex than previously understood and that higher levels of residual uncertainty arise in terms regulatory control and financial stability. This partly relates to the increased complexity of modern markets through the massive increases in size, depth and integration that have emerged in recent decades as well as the interrelated effects of complex network systems. 

Network theory in other disciplines has increasingly been used in the financial area to attempt to understand some of the connections, dependencies and relations that arise that can trigger instability and crisis. Attention has also increasingly been drawn to the emotional nature of investment and trading practices. This may, in particular, result in collective or herd behaviour and apparently irrational larger consequences from individual rational decisions. Allowances for all of these factors have to be made in constructing any new financial stability policy or agenda.

Regulatory authorities have then become much more sensitive to the difficulties that can arise with regard to individual decision taking and to predicting individual investor behaviour. It is clear that many decisions are taken on a more intuitive rather than strictly rational basis while individual rational choice can still have irrational collective effects. Behavioural economics and finance has an income of more importance in recent years while the authorities have also looked at network effects and complex causal chains.​[154]​

There have been considerable calls for reform following the recent financial crisis although care must be taken not to overreact and impose excessive regulatory burdens that may be ineffective in practice and only further undermine the efficiency of or destabilise markets going forward. All relevant causal factors have to be taken into account as well as the additional complications that can arise with regard to individual investor and firm motivation and choice and causal effect.

7.	REGULATORY APPROACH AND OBJECTIVES 

The general framework approaches adopted by legislatures or regulatory agencies have generally been described in terms of ‘institutional’ and ‘functional’. Institutional regulation focuses on the particular type of firm or entity involved while functional regulation stresses the activity. Difficulties nevertheless arise with regard to both more traditional approaches. More modern formulations tend to highlight core regulatory objectives such as systemic stability and consumer protection with a dual (‘twin peak’) institutional regulatory system being adopted.​[155]​ 

A considerable amount of confusion has arisen in attempting to understand and explain the two more traditional approaches of institutional and functional regulation and then the new objectives based approach. This principally arises as a result of the confusion created where the term objectives is used with different meanings or senses. Objectives can be understood in terms of initial justification or need, strategy, target or purpose (or result and effect), function or mandate (agency obligation), more general policy (collective strategies or targets) and more specific tools or instruments. The specific use intended has to be clarified in any specific case. For the purposes of this paper, objectives is understood in terms of the specific strategies, targets, purposes, results or effects intended. 

More recent formulations have then identified further more specific regulatory objectives or functions with a dedicated agency being set up in respect of each. These functions may include systemic, prudential, retail and wholesale conduct of business, markets and exchanges and competition.​[156]​ A series of other more specific or general policy objectives​[157]​ can also be identified and imposed on regulatory authorities.​[158]​ These may not justify the imposition of full authorisation or licensing systems or other regulatory controls directly although they can be used to refine the nature of the controls imposed or target the effects to be secured.

A number of other regulatory objectives or principles can be identified with which authorities can be required to comply. These partly correspond with other more general policy areas that can be identified including consumer protection policy, competition policy, criminal law as well as monetary, economic and fiscal policy.​[159]​ These can then be considered to constitute more general targets or alternatively specific sub-objectives or purposes within the regulatory policy or these other policy areas.














(xii)	Financial contribution and welfare.​[172]​

The UK FSMA imposes four specific statutory objectives in connection with market confidence, public awareness, consumer protection and financial crime (s2(2) FSMA) with seven additional standards or ‘principles’ being imposed in connection with resource efficiency, management responsibility, proportionality, innovation and competition (s2(e) FSMA). The most significant omission from the statutory objectives is clearly financial stability. This can be explained in terms of this being a shared function between the Treasury, Bank of England and FSA as discharged under the MoU entered into between them in 1998 and revised in 2006 and then following the most recent financial crises. 

Depositor protection is included in s 2(1) although postponed until after ‘public awareness’ with reducing financial crime being imposed as a fourth objective. These do not correspond with the strict justifications or rationale for financial regulation identified.​[173]​ The relationship between the regulatory objectives and ancillary standards or principles imposed separately is also not consistent. This does nevertheless impose a series of obligations on the FSA which creates a corresponding accountability framework with the general objectives identified being best understood in more general political rather than strictly financial or regulatory terms.​[174]​

The main difficulty that arises in imposing multiple objectives is in defining these clearly and ensuring that they do not conflict but can operate effectively together. The UK FSA is given considerable discretion in prioritising and implementing its statutory objectives and then its additional regulatory standards or principles​[175]​. Even with a general prioritisation discretion, the authority may still be overloaded where too many ancillary objectives are imposed or multiple compliance may dilute the effectiveness of one or more of the core or ancillary objectives. The success of this in practice will generally be dependent on the capability and commitment of the agency which can be reviewed as part of the larger accountability regime established. 

The UK FSA has generally be praised for the lead that it has taken in the development of Financial Capability as well as in assisting combat financial crime including money laundering specifically. Each of these activities is also dealt with through separate divisions which should avoid administrative or management distraction in carrying out these functions. It is nevertheless still essential that the FSA senior management and Board secure the effective achievement of all of its core and ancillary objectives.

The Bank of England was required to contribute to financial stability, in addition to its responsibilities in respect of the conduct of monetary policy, under the Banking Act 2009 with the FSA being given an express financial stability objective under the Financial Services Act 2010. FSA function and objective will now be reconsidered under the subsequent proposals announced by the incoming Coalition Government in May 2010​[176]​. 





Regulatory policy can be understood to refer to the body of rules, regulations and collective decisions governing the design and operation of a particular regulatory system. This will then include the underlying rationale or justification for regulation, agreed primary and ancillary objectives, the particular structure adopted as well as other design issues including tools, source and content.​[177]​ Effective regulatory policy depends upon arriving at the most appropriate set of conclusions with regard to each of these issues.

One of the difficulties that arises is that regulatory policy and narrow regulatory policy objectives are often confused with other legitimate but possibly conflicting policy targets or areas. These may include consumer protection policy,​[178]​ competition policy,​[179]​ criminal policy​[180]​ as well as monetary policy,​[181]​ economic policy​[182]​ and fiscal policy.​[183]​ A number of the sub-objectives or principles that arise in the financial area can be understood as being specific instances of these other policy targets. These include financial awareness and financial capability, efficiency, competition and innovation as well as limiting crime and promoting high standards of integrity or ethical standards. 

These are valid and legitimate policy objectives in their own terms. It is simply necessary to ensure an appropriate balance is achieved in setting the mandates for regulatory agencies and in prioritising the goals to be secured. Agencies must be able to carry out their primary tasks as well as manage other more ancillary functions. They must also have necessary resources to perform all of these tasks. Accountability regimes should also be structured to reflect performance in each of these areas with priority being given to core responsibilities.

Two areas of particular difficulty concern stability policy and welfare policy. Attention has increasingly been drawn to financial stability following the recent crises although this remains a difficult and confused area with little clear direction and formulation. Financial stability may, as has been discussed, be understood in terms of ensuring that markets are able to continue to discharge their core functions on an ongoing basis or, at least, without major disruption or without significant additional cost. Functions are then understood in terms of deposit (savings), credit (loan), payment (transfer), investment (return) and insurance (protection or cover). Fs policy will then include regulatory policy in terms of avoiding any systemic threat although financial stability can also be understood more positively to include promoting innovation, efficiency and competition as well as management responsibility and proportionality.​[184]​ These may either be understood as forming part of regulatory policy or separate competition and economic policy and possibly consumer protection policy. Fs may also be defined to include an element of monetary stability.

In reconsidering any more general regulatory reform agenda at the national, regional or international levels, the relevant agencies should consider the meaning and content of financial stability. This may then either be defined in more narrow market terms equated with financial regulation and regulatory policy or in a more general manner to include other related policy areas including consumer protection, competition, financial crime, monetary and economic policy. No single or absolute model again exists (as with single regulators)​[185]​. Considering and clarifying this issue would nevertheless assist construct or reconstruct more effective and longer lasting regulatory systems at each level.

The other difficult issue that remains is to what extent financial regulation should include an overt economic or social welfare element. Regulatory commentators, including the UK Turner Review, have raised the issue of using regulation to limit product development or other innovation where this does not secure any wider economic function beyond creating liquidity, income or rent extraction for financial counter parties​[186]​. It will be difficult, if not impossible, to define appropriate and inappropriate products or practices under this standard and to ensure any effective enforcement. This nevertheless remains a desirable larger objective and has clearly been adopted partly for political reasons in light of the public support that it could engender. 





The issue of regulatory structure has generally focused more recently on whether financial regulation should be organised on either an institutional, functional or policy or objectives basis and whether a single or multiple agency structure should be set up. Institutional regulation is based the particular type of firm or entity concerned, functional regulation on activity and policy or objectives on the targeted results to be achieved.​[187]​ 

Where a policy approach is to be followed, one more sub-issue that has arisen is whether monetary and regulatory policy should be combined within the central bank or separated.​[188]​ This is distinct from functional regulation which is concerned with the natural divisions that arise between financial markets or sectors (including banking, securities and insurance) and whether dedicated supervisory authorities should be appointed in each area. This is again distinct from objectives or policy regulation which considers other non-regulatory areas (such as consumer protection and competition policy).  

The main parallel debate that has arisen has been whether a ‘single regulator’ system should be adopted as against a multiple agency structure. If a multiple agency model is to be followed, this may then be structured on either an institutional, functional or policy basis. The issue of single regulation became of particular importance in the UK following the size of the victory secured by the Labour Government coming into power in May 1997 which allowed for a fundamental revision of the structure of financial regulation and elimination of earlier regulatory agencies. The UK has then been able to take forward a number of important initiatives in this area.​[189]​





A number of papers have been published in connection with regulatory systems design.​[191]​ These have generally explained and criticised the two more traditional institutional and functional approaches as being inadequate and incomplete and then either proposed new models based either on two core objectives of systemic stability and consumer protection (the ‘Twin Peaks’ approach of Taylor)​[192]​ or of multiple objectives.​[193]​ The difficulty with these approaches is that they can confuse regulatory functions with larger governmental economic or legal policy objectives. This can be dealt with more simply by identifying all relevant objectives and assigning them to the most efficient agency to discharge them. Where more than one objective is allocated to a particular body, some prioritisation may be considered appropriate or the agency given a more general discretion to determine its own allocation of function (as with the FSA in the UK).​[194]​   





In reconsidering the singular regulator debate, three separate sets of arguments actually arise in terms of whether a country should adopt a single market (market integration), single regulator (agency or institutional integration) and single regulation (legal or regulatory integration) solution. These can be considered separately in the following sub-sections.

The fundamental issue to be considered is whether legal restrictions should be maintained between financial institutions conducting activities in more than one core financial sector. Such sector separation was formerly maintained under the Glass Steagall sections of the Banking Act 1933 in the United States which prevented commercial banks from undertaking securities or investment banking business. This statutory separation was reinforced through the Bank Holding Company Act with similar restrictions applying in the insurance area.

These constraints were subsequently relaxed under the Gramm Leach Bliley Financial Competitiveness Act 2002. While this permitted the establishment of 'financial holding companies' that could own subsidiaries in more than one core area, underlying sector separation has still been maintained. This accordingly only represented deregulation of ownership rules and of the underlying separation policy historically followed in the United States.   

The style of regulation adopted in the United States has traditionally been referred to as ‘functional’ to the extent that regulatory focus is on the specific activity (or function) rather than the institution concerned. This is in contrast with the ‘institutional’ regulation maintained on the European Continent where universal banks can freely undertaking banking and securities business. The focus is then on the individual entity or institution rather than the activity concerned.

A functional approach has also generally been maintained in the United Kingdom. This has not, however, been based on any formal statutory prohibition (as in the Unite States) but has arisen as a result of the natural development of market practice with banks extending their activities through the establishment of separate subsidiaries rather than providing cross-sector services through existing branch structures. The United States and United Kingdom systems have accordingly both been based on functional regulation although this has historically only been legally enforced in the United States.





Whether markets are to be allowed to integrate or not, the related issue that arises is whether a single agency system should be established or whether a multiple agency structures should be maintained. This will obviously become of particular importance where sector integration is to be permitted although this is not necessary from a policy perspective. In countries such a Japan and Germany, a single financial agency has been created although a separate legislative framework continued on a sector separation model. Agency rather than legislative integration has accordingly been achieved.  

A multiple agency structure has been maintained in such other countries as the United States. This, however, largely reflects the complex legal and administrative systems and  structures followed in the United States rather than any specific policy position as such. Banking accordingly continues to be regulated on a ‘dual’ basis with four main federal agencies (the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC))) and fifty two separate state banking superintendents. Insurance is also regulated at the state level with only securities having a single federal agency with the SEC. Full cross-sector financial activity is accordingly still not permitted in the United States. The establishment of financial sector holding companies has nevertheless required that a primary (umbrella) supervisor is appointed. After some difficult debate, this task was conferred on the Federal Reserve (rather than the OCC which is generally considered to be an office of the Treasury in Washington DC). Appropriate exchange of information and co-operation systems have also been established between all of the main United States regulatory agencies (including with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)).

The single regulator issue was considered directly in the United Kingdom during the late 1990s following the perceived difficulties that had arisen with regard to the complex market (self-regulation) based system of regulation adopted in the securities area. The earlier delegated structure set up under the Financial Services Act 1986 was then abolished with the establishment of a single agency with the FSA which was formally constituted on 28 October 1998.

Responsibility for banking supervision was also transferred to the FSA under the Bank of England Act 1998 (section 21(a)). This was considered necessary to avoid separate problems arising with banking crises undermining the newly strengthened autonomy of the Bank of England as the central bank for the conduct of monetary policy in the United Kingdom. Although operational autonomy had earlier been conferred on the Bank, full policy and operational autonomy was confirmed under the Bank of England Act 1998. Banking and securities supervisory integration accordingly arose as a result of the convergence of two separate policy responses rather than any single policy decision. It was then subsequently announced over a period to time that responsibility for the supervision of other general and specific sectors would then also be conferred on the FSA. Agency integration accordingly arose more out of political and policy accident rather any original considered intent.

A number of arguments can be advanced in support of and against the establishment of a single regulatory authority (see supporting table). These are generally concerned with such issues as administrative structure, operational efficiency and policy integrity. Arguments can be advanced either for or against institutional consolidation in each case.

It would appear that absolute theoretical conclusion can necessarily be drawn with the degree of relevant advantage and disadvantage being dependent upon such matters as local culture and conditions, existing regulatory and legal structures and the degree of relative market sophistication or otherwise. The key is then not enforcing any single solution but adopting appropriate corrective action mechanisms to deal with any perceived inadequacies that arise depending upon the initial option selected. Corrective adjustment rather than a theoretical absolutism is then the core consideration.

In terms of more general trends, the tendency is nevertheless possibly for the establishment of single regulators in smaller less developed markets as well as the most complex and sophisticated markets with multiple systems (involving three or more regulators) being used in intermediate situations. One of the determining factors in each case may be whether underlying market integration is to be permitted. If sector separation is to be legally enforced, the relative disadvantages may generally outweigh the advantages of establishing a single regulator. Significant efficiency, policy and operational advantage will nevertheless arise where sector integration is to be allowed.





Even where a single regulator is to be established, the further issue that arises is then whether an integrated or structurally separate regulatory system should also be created. As noted, a single regulator has recently been set up in such countries as Germany (and Japan) although initially only to enforce the separate legislative provisions set up under each of the former sector financial laws. A single regulator has accordingly been created but not single regulation.

In the United Kingdom, the FSA was given statutory power under the Financial Services and Markets Act to issue rules (section 138) and guidance (section 157). The main functions of the FSA are, in fact, defined in terms of this core rule making power (section 2(4)(a)) supplemented by the issuance of other codes, guidance and policy and principles (section 2(4)(a), (c) and (d)). 

The FSA has since used these conferral powers to create a new consolidated ‘Handbook of Rules and Guidance’ which sets out all supervisory and regulatory provision that applies with regard to the oversight and regulation of all financial services and markets within the United Kingdom. A single handbook or rulebook has accordingly been created for all financial activity.

In terms of transitional provision, in moving from a separate sector based legislative system to a new integrated regime, it was realised that it would not be possible to complete the integration of all provisions within the new Handbook in the period immediately following the establishment of the FSA and the coming into effect of the Financial Services and Markets Act. A number of the earlier sector defined regulatory provisions (especially with regard to financial and systems requirements) were accordingly continued on a transitional basis under the interim prudential sourcebooks (IPRU(BANK), IPRU(INV) [securities], IPRU(INS) [insurance], IPRU(FS) [friendly societies] and IPRU(BS) [building societies]).  Each of these sets of interim provisions are then to be replaced by the single final integrated sourcebook (the PSB or PRU). While it was intended that this would come into effect during 2004, the bank and credit related sections have had to be delayed until 2006 with the implementation of the final provisions adopted under the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision's New Capital Accord.

The FSA Handbook in the United Kingdom accordingly creates a common framework for all services and markets under its six block structure. This includes the establishment of a number of equally applicable general provisions (Block 1 High Level Standards) as well as common authorisation, supervision and enforcement provisions under the Block 3 Process manuals. Certain other common provisions apply such as with regard to money launder (ML) and training and competence (TC) as well as (Block 4) redress (complaints and compensation). The earlier interim prudential sourcebooks (in the Block 3 Business Standards section) will, in time, be replaced by the final PSB (PRU) which will then create a single set of financial and management requirements. 

The final PSB (PRU) will operate on an integrated basis insofar as possible although the nature of the distinct underlying separate financial risks involved have still to be recognised. A new 'risk by risk' system has accordingly been established which involves the identification of a number of core exposures mainly consisting of credit risk, market risk, insurance risk, group risk and earnings risk. Each of these will be separately identified, defined and measured with appropriate capital and other financial or systems obligations applying in each case. This then develops the larger 'supervision by risk' system adopted and will operate within the new ‘general operating framework’ and ‘regulatory approach’ being constructed.

The FSA has accordingly been able with its news Handbook and, in particular, the PSB to set up a fully integrated regulatory framework that will operate on the basis of a common set of rules and operational procedures. At the centre of this, however, separate specific requirements will have to be applied to each of the distinct core financial risks concerned. The full benefits of a fully integrated regime should then be possible although in a manner that maintains full respect for the nature of the underlying distinct exposures concerned.

A number of complex issues arise with regard to the integration of financial markets in modern national and global practice. With this, three particular core issues can be identified in terms of market operation, supervisory or institutional structure and regulatory content. While each is separate, they are also intimately linked and operate on a consecutive or consequential basis.  

The initial issue to be considered in each case is whether market integration or market separation should be adopted as the core operational policy to be applied. If underlying market separation is to be maintained, some. but possibly not significant, institutional advantages may arise with the creation of a single regulator. The system will necessarily have to continue operate on the basis of a distinct sector based legislative structure. Where market integration is to be permitted, a single agency may be more appropriate (on an institutional regulatory model) although this is still not absolutely necessary. The main difficulty that will have to be dealt with in such a case is ensuing that there is sufficient co-ordination of activity and exchange of information and co-operation between the separate functional authorities involved.

If sector integration is to be permitted and a single agency established, the additional issue that then arises is whether this should operate on a single or multiple regulatory (rules) basis. If a single market and single agency option is adopted, relative advantage will probably favour the consequent construction of a single set of common regulatory requirements or rule book. Arguments may then again be advanced for and against this operating on either a statutory or some form of secondary or delegated basis. The particular advantage of a rules (as oppose to statutory framework) based system is that it provides the full validity of operating within a larger legal framework but at the same time retain sufficient flexibility to allow easy adjustment to reflect changes in market structure and practice. This as the reason for adopting a rules based framework in the United Kingdom.

It has to be accepted that the establishment of the new integrated regime in the United Kingdom has a certain logical inevitability once it had been decided to allow the development of open and unrestricted cross-sector markets and to set up a single regulatory authority. Where a significant degree of sector separation is to be maintained for efficiency or stability reasons, such as in the United States, a holding company option creates a useful and workable alternative or compromise position. Freedom of choice and action in other intermediate situations will then partly be dependent on political manoeuvrability and commitment as well as other prevailing local legal, market and cultural conditions.  





It would appear then that there is no absolute theoretical model for either the adoption of a single or multiple regulatory structure. Model selection is dependent on local factors and conditions as outlined. The key is then the subsequent regulatory correction or adjustment which has to take place in removing any corresponding disadvantages created following the single or multiple model decision taken.

There may nevertheless be a longer-term single model or integrated solution or presumption in light of the complexity and information demands of modern market and regulatory systems. Market complexity and the degree of underlining market integration may make it impossible or, at least, inefficient for any single agency to monitor the whole of the financial system. Multiple objectives and the imposition of new complex regulatory models may only be possible using a single integrated institutional structure. The demands of modern information collection, processing and exchange of itself may justify centralisation of regulatory function, at least, at the national level with as much integration or exchange as practically possible at either the regional or international levels. The adoption of a single solution is also supported by the need for co-ordinated regulatory action and enforcement across all markets and sectors within a single country as well as for centralised co-ordination between cross-border agencies. The need for financial stability to be managed on a central basis and for extended market support mechanisms to be made available in the event of a major crisis may also favour the adoption of a unitary model.

The new UK regulatory model announced in June 2010 appears to have moved from the earlier functional and then single regulatory formats to a new central bank based model​[195]​. Some commentators have referred to this as the adoption of a Twin Peaks approach by the UK although this is incorrect as there will now be three separate authorities with regulatory function consisting of the Bank of England, the CPMA and ECA with the PRA to operate as a subsidiary of the Bank. The Treasury will still exercise formal oversight of regulatory policy and support operations within the UK​[196]​. This has also been described in terms of the abandonment of the earlier integrated approach set up by the previous Labour administration. The new split model nevertheless still retains single regulation, with a single core prudential regulatory function, and open, liberal single markets. This only then represents an institutional revision with the incorporation of the regulatory functions of the FSA into the PRA within the Bank and establishment of the separate CPMA and ECA.

The new proposed UK model is then significant in that it retains fundamental regulatory integration, reconnects monetary and regulatory policy and superimposes on this a new macro-prudential function. This then creates a new central bank macro-prudential based model for the first time. The new functional approach then distinguishes systemic and non-systemic activities with non-systemic responsibilities being transferred or delegated to the separate CPMA and ECA with the Bank of England retaining a single integrated micro and macro-prudential function. The reason for this can simply be understood in terms of the need to avoid overloading the Bank or confusing core systemic policies (that is prudential regulation and macro-prudential oversight) with non-systemic tasks (consumer protection and economic crime enforcement)​[197]​.













The system must either operate on a single or multiple agency basis with the core laws either operating on a functional or institutional basis. This is generally achieved through the imposition of a statutory ‘general prohibition’ on a specific activity without some form of official licensing or permission (such as under s19(1) FSMA). Many countries retain multiple agency functional based structures although a number of hybrid systems are also emerging while some countries are moving towards full single regulatory models based on a combination of market, agency and regulatory integration.​[199]​ 

(c)	Regulatory Scope or Tools

Various options arise with regard to the extent or degree of control to be imposed and the entities covered. Five basic systems may be distinguished:

(i)	Authorisation or licensing systems;​[200]​
(ii)	Permission system;​[201]​












Almost all regulatory systems operate within a larger legal framework. This may either apply under general Constitutional provisions or express statutes with some powers possibly being exercisable under the general law such as with regard to imposing criminal penalties or civil rights of recovery. Most modern regulatory systems operate on the basis of a core statutory general prohibition as discussed.​[205]​ Statutes such as the UK FSMA generally establish the structure within which the regulatory system will operate by creating or recognising the core entities, conferring necessary powers and functions, designating relevant penalties as well as providing for an appropriate accountability and redress regime.

The laws themselves will be made up of a series of core financial or regulatory statutes, in one or more areas depending upon whether a single or multiple system has been adopted, as well as other criminal offences as well as other civil rights of recovery either under statute or the common law.





Specific regulatory obligations may then either be imposed under multiple or a single financial statute or through some delegated power. This can be most easily achieved by establishing a rules based system with the regulatory agency being given power to issue its own rules containing the specific obligations with which regulated entities must comply. Self-regulatory organisations (SROs) were given power to issue their own rulebooks under the 1986 Financial Services Act in the UK which was superseded by the single Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. The UK system now operates on the basis of the FSA being provided with a rules issuance power under s138 FSMA and other more specific provisions.​[206]​

Rules have the advantage of having full legal effect (with the UK FSA rules having the same legal effect as statutory instruments). They can nevertheless be issued under a simplified procedure which saves time and cost and allows for ease of revision as markets and practice change. This also avoids the need to have all of the detailed regulatory obligations set out in the original statute which would become particularly unwieldy under a single regulatory regime as in the UK.





Regulatory obligations may also be imposed under more general principles rather than either rules or underlying or original statutory provision. Principles can be considered to constitute more general forms of regulatory obligation. These can, for example, be used to establish general standards of compliance beyond adherence with any particular regulatory obligation. The FSA refers to the general principles set out in s2(3) of the FSMA as its ‘principles of good regulation’ with which it has to comply in addition to the statutory objectives set out in s2(2) FSMA.​[207]​ Further general principles are also used with the 11 general standards imposed under the FSA High Level Principles (PRIN).​[208]​ 

Principles have the advantage of being more general in content and meaning which avoids evasion through strict compliance. They are also more informal and flexible and are intended to secure a more general culture of compliance within the financial industry. They also facilitate ease of enforcement and do not require specific amendment in light of their general content. Difficulties may nevertheless arise with regard to authority and validity,​[209]​ lack of clarity, possible ease of avoidance, sanction and enforcement and possible abuse.





Authorities may also issue more general non-legal or non-enforceable supervisory or regulatory guidance. The Bank of England issued a number of more informal supervisory papers during the 1980s and early 1990s before responsibility for bank supervision was transferred to the FSA under the Bank of England Act 1988. The FSA was also given an express power to issue guidance under s157 FSMA with most of the content in its Handbook being made up of guidance rather than express rules. This clarifies the nature of the obligations imposed and assists regulated entities ensure adherence and compliance.

(v)	Financial Discretion and Action

Regulatory obligations may also be considered to be imposed through the exercise of regulatory discretion or administrative decision taking powers and actions. These may either relate to breaches of specific regulatory obligation or more general principles or otherwise result from the exercise of a discretionary power conferred on a regulatory agency. The system of bank supervision in the UK operated on an essentially informal ‘moral suasion’ basis before the coming into effect of the Banking Act 1979. Bank of England staff were able to ensure that UK banks generally complied with expected standards of good market practice on an informal and judgement basis without specific statutory authority or obligation. This generally operated on the basis of the implied threat of withdrawal of daily liquidity or emergency lender of last resort financial support.​[213]​





Most regulatory systems are based on a series of common rules. These may be given effect to through various sets of laws, rules and principles or guidance as well as separate financial, criminal and civil laws. The core regulatory system is then made up of parallel ‘financial’ or ‘regulatory’ rules as well as ‘conduct’ rules (private relations) and ‘market’ (stock markets or exchange) rules. These determine the internal structure and operation of the financial system. Other external support mechanisms are maintained by the central bank or monetary authority. These traditionally comprise lender of last resort emergency lending facilities although more complex new support mechanisms have been developed since the recent financial crises.​[214]​ 





Financial or regulatory rules generally consist of separate market entry and market exit provisions governing firms, persons and markets depending upon the complexity of the particular regime. 

Market entry rules determine access to the particular market or the financial system more generally. This is basically given effect to through a general prohibition of some form that limits access to the market without appropriate authorisation or licensing or other approval, recognition, registration or notification.​[215]​ This is given effect to, for example, in the UK under ss19 (general prohibition) and 20 (permission requirement) FSMA. Market entry or access is then governed through a series of separate authorisation, supervision and enforcement provisions. These were given effect to in the UK through the AUTH, SUP and ENF (now Enforcement Guide) contained in the FSA Handbook. These regulate the conditions or criteria governing initial market entry (authorisation) as well as continuing compliance on an ongoing basis (through supervision) and correction or sanction in the event of breach (enforcement).

Various criteria may be imposed under an authorisation system. These generally consist of a series of suitability (fit and properness), systems (internal operational procedures and controls) and solvency (initial capital) conditions. Other conditions may also be imposed with regard to such matters are ‘status’ (legal authority or condition), ‘situation’ (location) and ‘structure’ (including connected parties or close links).​[216]​

Supervision is generally dealt with through ‘returns’, ‘reports’ and ‘relations’ (management meetings). Financial institutions are generally required to file regulatory prudential returns on a monthly, quarterly and annual basis in connection with such matters as capital and trading positions as well as foreign exchange and other matters. Additional special reports may be commissioned such as from the internal accountants or auditors or from external parties. Regular meetings will also be held with management on a ‘bilateral’ basis as well as other ‘trilateral’ meetings including the supervisory authorities and the accountants or auditors. Additional reviews or inspections may be conducted with the authorities or other inspectors having a right to visit premises and access documents or conduct interviews with personnel.

A supporting enforcement system is maintained to ensure compliance.​[217]​ This generally operates on a sanction (fine or public or private censure) basis with additional penalties often being imposed in connection with scope of authorisation (perimeter breaches) as well as safely or stability concerns (with power to apply for injunction or restitution orders).​[218]​





Separate conduct rules will be imposed governing the relationship between market counterparties or between market counterparties and their clients. These generally consist of a series of conduct of business (COB)​[221]​ as well as criminal law and civil law. Extended provisions are generally given effect to through Conduct of Business Rules (COB) in the securities areas mainly due to the additional conflicts of interest that arise with firms dealing as principal and on behalf of clients and on behalf of separate clients. This creates potentially multiple horizontal and vertical conflicts. These are generally resolved through a series of money (cash) and securities segregation (separation) as well as other best advice, best execution and know your customer obligations. Many modern systems now also include separate client identification provisions for money laundering and anti-terrorist financing purposes.

Separate criminal measures will also be imposed in connection with insider dealing in addition to general common law theft or fraud offences. This are supplemental to any separate money laundering or anti-terrorist obligations imposed on financial institutions.





Separate measures are  imposed in connection with the structure and operation of stock markets and exchanges. These govern the primary markets (of first issuance) and secondary (trading) markets as well as any separate settlement and clearing systems. UK primary markets are principally governed by the Listing Rules incorporated within the FSA Handbook after the FSA became responsibility as the competent authority for listing under Part XI FSMA. This was formerly discharged by the London Stock Exchange before it demutualised in 1999.​[224]​ The listing regime has since been amended to give effect to the EU requirements imposed under inter alia the Prospectus Directive.​[225]​ Secondary trading will generally be dealt with through the rulebook of the particular exchange as supplemented by the criminal provisions governing insider trading and any separate market abuse rules. 





Financial regulation has been subject to substantial change and development over the last 100 years. This has involved clarifying its proper justification and practice and expanding and extending available tools and resources. Financial regulation has also had to be more fundamentally reconsidered following their recent crises in national and international financial markets. It is now necessary to begin to construct a new ‘Regulatory Agenda’ which is capable of realising the inherent and natural benefits of markets at the same time as limit possible sources of instability, damage and collapse.

(1)	Market Value and Market Evolution

Markets and financial markets are highly effective and necessary tools, processes or mechanisms. Almost no non-purely personal activity or relations would be possible without the essential valuation as well as savings, credit, payment, investment and insurance services provided. The objective of any financial market policy must be to ensure the full benefits of an open dynamic marketplace with all of the further advantages provided in terms of innovation, growth and expansion and wealth generation that markets facilitate.

Markets have nevertheless been subject to an extended and complex evolutionary process. This has led to the emergence of the increasingly sophisticated and inter-connected markets that dominate today including separate money, capital, insurance, foreign exchange and other asset management and commodity sectors. Many of these still operate in accordance with common general principles or structures and all are ultimately based on financial claims.​[228]​
 
(2)	Market Regulation and Market Cost

Regulation should only be imposed on the basis of an identifiable ‘market failure’ with a specific ‘regulatory default’ or ‘market default’ test being used to determine whether any new instances of control should be introduced or existing measures maintained. Any looser formulations such as ‘public policy’ or ‘public interest’ arguments or other non-default specific tests should be avoided. Care must specifically be undertaken to ensure that regulatory controls do not benefit the regulated parties at the expense of market counterparties or the recipients of services as revealed by the US public choice and capture writings.​[229]​ There must be clear, measurable and substantial welfare loss that justifies the restriction of more general free market principle.





It is inevitable that financial crises and instability may arise from unforeseen or collective factors that cannot be attributed to the activities of any specific institution or some reasonable proportionate share of liability assigned. This may, for example, arise with regard to the impact of common or ‘herd’ conduct or other collective behaviour or unforeseen consequences arising from rational or irrational action. 

One of the specific difficulties that arose with the recent financial crisis was that product complexity and higher returns were to a substantial extent driven by investor demand rather than intermediary supply in the wholesale or professional markets. Specific difficulties may arise where highly liquid wholesale markets develop (including in the ‘shadow banking’ sector) which allow counterparties to take on increasingly high levels of funding at low cost which is then used for other lending or investment purposes. Asset prices will also rise in markets, such as the housing sector, when high levels of liquidity are available which allow individuals and commercial property investors to take on increasingly high levels of debt and leverage.

In such cases, regulatory authorities must be prepared to provide necessary support in the event of a major systemic event arising. This can be justified on the basis of a larger public need to maintain the stability and continued viability of the marketplace. Where the authorities are not prepared to provide this support, they must prevent such markets from developing although this has to be set against that damage that will otherwise then arise in terms of loss of opportunity and the higher costs of funding than would otherwise be available.

(4)	Market Failure and Regulatory Balance

New financial regulations should only be introduced where there has been clear and demonstrable market failure rather than perceived regulatory failure as such. Regulatory correction should only be imposed where some specific instance of regulatory control is required to correct a clear and identified market failure or market default. The principal danger from the recent financial crises is that authorities will overreact and impose unnecessary and excessive regulation that will cause further damage in terms of loss of liquidity and cost of funding in the short and medium term and even precipitate further crisis due to the distorted effects of the interventions imposed in the longer term.

It could be argued that the recent crisis did not arise from significant or fundamental regulatory failure directly as such. The general pre-conditions to the crisis principally arose from high debt and credit levels, increased product complexity, co-mingling of high-risk debt (infection), credit rating and pricing failures and uncertainty as to loss distribution and liability. One of the key factors was then uncertainty with regard to the amount of loss generated on structured finance products including specifically CDOs, distribution of and liability for this loss as well as the capability of firms to absorb the loss (depending on their capital levels and capability of being able to recapitalise in the short term and ultimate uncertainly with regard to the nature, extent and availability of official market support). It was these specific instances of uncertainty that led to the collapse in confidence that arose. Any new regulatory correction should be minimal, targeted and proportionate and only deal with specific instances of failure identified.

(5)	Market History and Market Crisis

The history of regulatory controls has generally been one in most countries of introducing additional measures on an aggregate or cumulative basis in response to each successive financial crisis or scandal. Increasingly complex but fundamentally incoherent and excessive results can follow. Recent financial crises have provided the opportunity to undertake a more fundamental review of the structure and operation of modern regulatory and supervisory practice. This should, as noted, nevertheless focus on identifying relevant market failure and specific instances of necessary regulatory correction. The ultimate response must be balanced, dedicated and proportionate. 

Past crises have confirmed that many instances of collapse are the result of asset price and credit bubbles. These generally follow from credit expansion, speculation, asset price peaks and collapses and subsequent contraction, de-leveraging and transfer (switch) to cash. Other difficulties may arise from inadequate oversight or supervision of relevant regulatory provision or some instances of regulatory gap or failure in particular cases.

Where lessons from the history of financial crisis and collapse are to be learned, these must be the correct reforms necessary.​[230]​ Uncontrolled deregulation and excessive competition can also undermine standards and stability rather than promote efficient market balance.

(6)	Supervisory and Financial Crisis

Contrary to many of the statements made in the press and official documents, the recent crisis was not a ‘banking crisis’ as such but a full financial systems or financial sector crisis. It is also arguable that the crisis did not arise from fundamental ‘regulatory failure’ but was rather the result of ineffective market oversight and the inadequate exercise or imposition of the available regulatory powers already in place. Reform should then focus on correcting inadequacies in financial rather than securing a larger ‘revolution’ in financial regulation which may only be misplaced and destructive rather than constructive.

Any system of financial regulation is ultimately based on the imposition of a series of market entry restrictions (enforced through a general statutory prohibition such as s19 of the UK FSMA) supported by a series of suitability (experience and governance), systems and controls (risk management) and financial reserves (capital and liquidity) obligations.​[231]​ Financial regulation is then based on suitability and governance, risk management and cover reserves. Where concerns arise with regard to any of these factors, most authorities have a full range of powers to allow them to require individual institutions to take necessary action to correct any identified deficiencies. This may, for example, include strengthening governance, improving training, replacing specific individuals carrying out important functions (referred to as approved persons in the UK under the FSMA) or increasing capital or liquidity cover levels. Authorities then have a range of powers to give effect to these directions including imposing higher capital charges or even restricting business or cancelling licences. 





Regulatory authorities should always have been responsible for monitoring and managing the financial stability of the financial systems and economy as a whole. It is then questionable whether authorities were entitled to admit that they perceived that their function was one of individual bank or financial institution oversight rather than of institutions collectively either within specific markets or sectors or across the financial system as a whole.​[232]​ 

This may partly be understood having regard to the separation of supervisory and monetary functions in some countries such as in the UK. The Bank of England had nevertheless established two separate ‘wings’ dealing with monetary stability and financial stability in the early 1990s following the collapse of BCCI. While the relationship between the Bank of England, FSA and Treasury was managed under a non-legally enforceable, Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) entered into in 1998 and then replaced in 2006, the authorities should still have been able to work together effectively in managing financial stability more generally. The specific defect that appeared to arise was a lack of continuing contact and co-ordination of activities at all levels between the financial stability division within the Bank and the corresponding market oversight sections within the FSA and the more specific implementation of supervisory policy at the line management level within the FSA. 

One of the key lessons from the recent crisis is the need to establish a more complete and effective market oversight regime based on the larger monitoring of risks and exposures within the financial markets and financial system as a whole with appropriate linkages being created between this larger stability function and the oversight of individual high impact firms or groups. A new ‘financial stability’ agenda or policy is accordingly required. 

While financial institutions and banks specifically are already supervised on a solo (individual) and group (consolidated) basis, this effectively has to be extended to include a third market (financial stability) level. It is in designing a new financial stability environment and infrastructure at the national, European and international levels that the most significant post-crises challenges arise. This author has already separately recommended that a series of ‘regulatory reform programmes’ are adopted with a series of new ‘financial stability handbooks’ or ‘toolkits’. The objective would be to establish a clearly defined financial stability function in all countries and with more effective co-ordination of financial stability activity at the European and international levels through the creation of corresponding inter-governmental or inter-agency stability oversight committees.​[233]​

(8)	New Risk Based Regulatory Agenda and Regulatory Reform Programmes

It is necessary to construct a new financial or regulatory agenda following the significant changes that have occurred in the structure and operation of financial markets in recent years and especially the recent crises. Markets have become much larger and complex as well as integrated and interdependent than ever before. The OTC nature of many transactions has also made the markets less transparent and more opaque which has obstructed supervisory and market oversight while the effectiveness of market discipline has been diluted more generally following the recent crises. The new sophistication in financial relations, policy and control has required significant revision especially following the further technological advances that have occurred especially in computing and risk management although faith in modern finance theory has been damaged in light of the pricing errors that occurred with the crisis. All of this has necessitated the revision of regulatory structure and policy. While this may not amount to a full revolution as such, it certainly requires the adoption of a new revised regulatory agenda. This will, in particular, be increasingly risk, rules and principles, objectives, better regulation and ultimately market based. 

Risk based supervision was introduced in the banking area in the UK by the Bank of England with its CAMEL (Capital Assets Market Earnings and Liquidity) and COM (Control Organisation and Management) model as part of its RATE framework. This was adopted following the Barings crisis in 1995 and the subsequent Arthur Andersen report.​[234]​ An earlier CAMEL system had been adopted in the US with a separate model used by the Securities and Futures Association (SFA) in the UK under the Financial Services Act 1986. While this was originally referred to as a risk based approach, the term risk based was then further extended by the FSA following its establishment in 1998 and its need to comply with the statutory obligations imposed under the FSMA. Risk based regulation was then amended to refer to compliance with each of the FSA’s objectives under an extended operating framework including its ARROW and ARROW II initiatives.​[235]​

Financial regulators have increasingly had to focus on the specific types of risk created or aggravated by developments in financial markets and market practice. The UK FSA has adopted an express risk based system with its integrated framework set up under the 2000 FSMA. This was necessary with the attempt to produce a single rulebook governing all financial services and markets. While many of the earlier sector rulebooks were continued on a provisional basis (under interim sourcebooks),​[236]​ it was always intended that these would be drawn together into a single integrated prudential sourcebook. This was initially referred to as the PSB and then the PRU.​[237]​

The need to create a single sourcebook for all sectors was dealt with by identifying six key financial risks with a separate chapter to be included with regard to each of these. These initially consisted of credit risk, market risk, insurance risk, liquidity risk, group risk and operational risk. The intellectual simplicity of the original proposals then had to be revised with the need to implement all of the separate EU directives including in the banking and securities as well as insurance and collective investment scheme areas. A series of separate final sourcebooks were then adopted including BIPRU in the banking and securities area.​[238]​

The UK FSA has then moved from an initial ‘risk based’ system to a more sophisticated ‘risk by risk’ regime involving the identification of each of the separate risks and applying specific provisions to their management and supervision. Such a system is not required in countries where separate sector regimes are maintained and where a single regulator has been set up but with separate financial laws being maintained such as in Germany. Where countries wish to move towards a more complete single regulation model, this risk and risk-by-risk based approach should be considered.

(9)	Rules and Principles Based

Regulation has also increasingly become rules and principles based in many countries as legislatures and authorities have attempted to rely on the cost, speed and efficiency gains available by imposing regulatory obligations under separate rules rather than formal statute law.​[239]​ This allows for increasingly complex rulebooks to be developed which can be amended quickly and at minimum cost as markets and practices develop. The FSA has the statutory power to issue rules and guidance under ss138 and 157 FSMA. 





Regulatory systems are also increasingly adopting a number of complex overlapping express objectives in place of earlier implied or simple legal formulations of the core duties of the regulatory authorities. Market or financial stability and minimum deposit or consumer protection is then supplemented by a series of additional goals or strategies. These may include financial education or capability, financial efficiency, financial competition, financial innovation, financial conduct, financial crime, financial responsibility, financial proportionality, more general financial ethics and financial value and welfare contribution. 









Financial regulation has also ultimately become increasingly market based as responsibility for risk management is assigned to market participants. Financial risk should principally be dealt with at the firm level where these exposures are initially generated and can be directly monitored and managed. Financial supervision had become more indirect and removed to the extent that authorities were content with confirming that the major firms had appropriate systems and controls to identify and manage their risks without the authorities becoming involved with the direct risk management process itself. As many firms failed to price the products they produced or dealt with and manage their own exposures during the recent crises and with authorities having to inject substantial amounts of capital to compensate for this, many agencies have confirmed that they will adopt a more direct and interventionist approach. This is still a question of degree to a certain extent. 

Some authorities have indicated that they will become more involved with the approval and design of specific products such as under the Turner Review. The authorities have indicated that they may wish to become more involved the originating process to ensure that specific products or services provide real or actual value and do not simply generate liquidity or fee income. This was largely a problem of complexity and lack of disclosure with investors not being able or refusing to assess or accept the risks involved in some of the more advanced structured products developed on the market. Much of this can be dealt with by market practice as investors initially withdraw and then undertake more effective risk assessment either directly or through enhanced credit rating agency practices and procedures. The authorities may wish to monitor new product areas although it is unlikely that any direct intervention would be required. Some of this may also be dealt through parallel revisions to other regulatory requirements such as in connection with capital adequacy and the withdrawal of certain securitisation advantages under the Basel II rules. This would also be undesirable from a innovation and market efficiency perspective. 





The core purpose of financial regulation remains to prevent the closure of individual institutions or the collapse of the markets as a whole as well as to protect the interests of the recipients of financial services. This can then be understood in terms of more traditional financial stability and consumer protection arguments. The meaning and nature of financial regulation has nevertheless become much more complex in recent years which will only become even more difficult following the recent crises in financial markets.

The meaning of key terms such as financial markets, finance and financial law and financial regulation have had to be reconsidered. Financial intermediation has become considerably more complex with continued innovation and integration within and between sectors and the creation of new or aggravated forms of financial risk and sources of instability. The justification for financial regulation has had to be reassessed especially following the apparent breakdown of market discipline and additional uncertainty created through complexity, network effects and irrationality.

Regulatory policy and approach has become much more complex with the identification of an increasingly extended number of legitimate regulatory objectives beyond stability and consumer protection. Regulatory functions have become more targeted and regulatory structures more complex especially with the evolution of single markets (integrated markets), single regulators (integrated agencies) and single regulation (integrated laws and regulatory) models in many countries.

The relationship between regulatory policy and other important policy areas including consumer protection, competition and monopolies and criminal law as well as monetary, economic and fiscal policy has also made the task of financial regulators more difficult as they have had to prioritise resources and strategies and work more effectively with other government and private agencies. Regulatory design has also become considerably more involved with decisions having to be taken with regard to proper purpose or objective and structure, tools, sources and regulatory content. The important but technical nature of this has also meant that regulatory design has had to be removed from legislatures and delegated to more specialist agencies while appropriate legal authority, accountability and redress mechanisms are maintained.

The core residual issue that arises is one of ultimate welfare benefit. Regulatory authorities have had to reconsider to what extent markets, products and practices can be allowed to continue to evolve naturally or to what extent limits or controls must be imposed on specific activities to ensure that economic or social benefit results in all cases and that market counterparties do not simply generate liquidity and profit for their own purposes. This raises difficult issues of judgement beyond pure regulatory policy including monetary management as well as economic policy and fiscal taxation and welfare redistribution at the national and international levels.

The challenges and risks created by financial markets have never been greater although neither have the potential benefits and welfare gains. The amount of information available has increased enormously although our understanding and appreciation of markets and market pressures have evolved and improved although almost certainly not to the same extent. The underlying regulatory challenge or solution remains the same as always. We need to realise the benefits and advantages of markets and market processes at the same time as limit their destabilising or destructive effects. In so doing, real welfare gains should be realised and the benefits of this distributed as widely as possible.
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^119	  	Llewellyn refers to: (a) potential systemic problems associated with externality; (b) the correction of other market imperfections and failures; (c) the need for monitoring of financial firms and economies of scale; (d) consumer confidence and positive externalities; (e) gridlock and adverse selection and moral hazard; (f) government generated moral hazard; and (g) consumer demand for regulation. Llewellyn (n 116) 9-10.
^120	  	Significant externalities also arise with regard pollution and environment damage. 
^121	  	The externality arises even with solvent banks due to the higher interest rates that may be imposed and losses suffered by depositors and the production damage passed on borrowers through loss of credit where this can be withdrawn quickly. For discussion, Goodhart (n 115) 203-204. The implied support provided through lender of last resort facilities may also be considered to amount to an externality. 
^122	  	Llewellyn (n 116) 28-30. Dowd (n) notes that the existence of LLR can have adverse incentive effects and induce bank managers to undertake excessive levels of risk. Benston and Kaufman (n) justify regulation on the basis of the need to contain the negative externalities resulting from government imposed deposit protection. 
^123	  	US deposit protection provided under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) provides full de facto (if not full de iure) cover which is intended to prevent bank runs through depositors withdrawing funds from banks. The UK ‘co-insurance’ and similar schemes provide only partial loss cover and are intended to be more consumer or depositor protection based (in providing funds for those most vulnerable in the event of loss being to suffered) rather than expressly to limit deposit withdrawals and bank runs. The lack of full cover (90%) and repayment limit £35,000 and subsequently raised to £50,000) resulted in depositors demanding repayment of funds from Northern Rock once the solvency instability of the bank was threatened. Walker (n 36). See also Goodhart (n 115)
^124	  	Goodhart (n 115) 204.
^125	  	Capital adequacy acts as a solvency buffer within which loss can be absorbed before the bank becomes technically insolvent at which point it will automatically lose its authorisation (licence) and directors be prevented from trading. No actual fund or segregated assets are nevertheless involved. Capital simply represents a nominal proportionate amount of the value of the bank as a going concern. This is distinct from liquidity which involves the retention of readily realisable assets to cover ongoing withdrawal demands. Walker (n 1). See also D V Diamond and P Dybvig, ‘Bank runs, deposit protection and liquidity’ Journal of Political Economy (1983) 91, 401-19; E Baltensperger and J Dermine, ‘The role of public policy in ensuring financial stability: A cross-country comparative perspective’ in Richard Portes and Alexander Swoboda (s eds) Threats to International Financial Stability (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1987); A Postlewaite and X Vives, ‘Bank runs as an equilibrium phenomenon’ Journal of Political Economy ( 1987) 95, 485-91; S Bhattacharya and J Jacklin, ‘Distinguishing panics and information-based runs: Welfare and policy implications’ Journal of Political Economy (1998) 96, 568-92; and V V Chari and R Jagannathan, ‘Banking panics, information and rational expectations equilibrium’ Journal of Finance (1988) 43, 749-61. See also D S Docking, M Hirschey and E Jones, ‘Information and contagion effects of bank loan-loss reserve announcements’ Journal of Financial Economics (February 1997) 43(2), 219-40; D Schoenmaker, ‘Contagion risk in banking’ (March 1996) LSE Financial Markets Group Discussion Paper No.239. See also Howard Davies, ‘Financial regulation: why bother?’ (January 1999) address to Society of Business Economists. On arguments against running on solvent banks and with deposit protection and LLR, see also Llewellyn (n 116) 15-18.
^126	  	Llewellyn refers to this as the ‘gridlock’ problem (27-28). This might be more accurately understood in terms of collective action or herding. This creates two problems in terms of adverse selection (with customers not being able to distinguish between firms that behave inappropriately and those that do not) and moral hazard (with good firms behaving inappropriately in light of other firms’ misconduct and the absence of any control on that misconduct). 
^127	  	Subsection (b).
^128	  	Llewellyn refers to this as justifying financial regulation on the basis of economies of scale in monitoring. Llewellyn (n 116) 23-25. Without central oversight, consumers would have to assume excessive costs in monitoring firms with substantial duplication and excessive social costs as well as loss of economies of scale in the centralised administration of the supervisory function. Goodhart similarly justifies central licensing rather than certification on the basis of transparency, simplicity and administrative convenience. Goodhart (n 115) 210-211.
^129	  	Below
^130	  	Goodhart (n 115) 204-205.
^131	  	Walker (n 1).
^132	  	Goodhart (n 115) 202-203.
^133	  	Brandeis (n 109).
^134	  	This can be understood in terms of initial ‘diagnosis’ or provision of professional advice and subsequent execution (treatment). Goodhart (n 115) 206-207.
^135	  	These can be summarised in terms of: (a) value and importance; (b) possibly limited, occasional or special purchase; (c) expectation of return; (d) complexity; (e) reliance and consequential short and potentially longer-term effects; (f) information transfer costs on appointment of a replacement advisor; (g) transaction costs; (h) conflicts of interest; and (i) possibility of fraud or other abuse (such as ‘churning’). For similar reference, Llewellyn (n 116) 18-19. Goodhart refers to Darby and Karni who distinguish between search qualities (known before purchase), experience qualities (known after purchase at no cost) and credence qualities (expensive to assess post-purchase). M R Darby, ‘Movements in purchasing power parity: The short and long runs’ in Darby et al (eds), The International Transmission of Inflation (University of Chicago Press Chicago 1980); and M R Darby and M Karni, ‘Free competition and the optimal amount of fraud’ Journal of Law and Economics (April 1973) 16(1). Goodhart (n 115) 208-210 and 212-213. Credence may be better referred to as reliance as it is concerned with the need for the customer to be able to trust or rely on the service provided on a long-term basis. Conflicts of interest can be managed in a number of ways including capacity separation, independence policy, internal ‘Chinese Walls’ or disclosure. Economists tend to favour occasional quality checks on efficiency grounds. G H Beales, ‘The economics of regulating the professions’ in R D Blair and S Rubin (eds) Regulating the Professions (Lexington Books Lexington Mass 1980) cited in Goodhart (n 115) 213 (n1).
^136	  	Goodhart notes that it is dubious whether it is possible to justify entry controls in order to limit externalities at 210. Quality control can also be dealt with through certification (such as under the UK banking ‘ladder’ approach with section 123 banks, section 127 banks, authorised deposit-takers and authorised banks) rather than full licensing. Beales (n 135).
^137	  	(n 135).
^138	  	(n 135).
^139	  	Llewellyn (n 116) 23.
^140	  	G J Benston, ‘Regulating financial markets: A critique and some proposals’ (1998) Institute of Economic Affairs London Hobart Paper No. 135. See also G J Benston, R A Eisenbeis, P M Horvitz, E J Kane and G G Kaufman, Perspectives on Safe and Sound Banking: Past, Present and Future (MIT Press Cambridge Mass 1986); and G J Benston and G Kaufman, ‘The Appropriate Role of Bank Regulation’ Economic Journal (1996) 106, 688-97.
^141	  	Sub-section (iii).
^142	  	See, for example, UK COBS contained in the FSA Handbook of Rules and Guidance under ss138 and 157 FSMA.
^143	 	The earlier Banking Codes were subsequently withdrawn in 2009 and replaced by the Banking Sourcebook within the FSA Handbook. 
^144	  	In more sophisticated markets, the recipients of financial services may demand regulation to ensure adequate minimum controls. Market counterparties may establish such provisions on a self-regulatory basis or through trade associations (such as in the international capital markets with the ICMA, LMA and ISDA). Retail consumers may also demand minimum regulatory standards through lobby groups at the national or possibly European levels. A considerable amount of UK consumer protection legislation over the last two-three decades has been driven by EU policy and the need to implement EU directive and other measures.  
^145	  	Market confidence is essential to protect the stability of asset prices and avoid undue volatility. This is also necessary to ensure that markets continue to operate. Where consumers have no confidence in the quality of the products on offer or cannot distinguish between good and bad products, they may withdraw from the market (referred to as ‘Akerlof’s lemons’). An equivalent breakdown in wholesale markets arose with the 2007-08 financial crisis with the freezing of lending on the inter-bank market. Walker (n 36).
^146	  	See, for example, FSA The Turner Review – A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis (March 2009) 39-49.
^147	  	(nn 92 and 92). Rational choice theory or rational action theory assumes that individuals will act in a manner that achieves the most effective welfare outcomes depending upon the assumptions made. 
^148	  	(a) market efficiency does not imply market rationality with markets possibly being distorted by self-reinforcing herd effects or price overshoots. Robert Shiller, ‘Efficient markets, random walks and bubbles’ in Shiller, Irrational Exuberance (2000) ch.9; (b) individual rationality does not necessarily ensure collective rationality with price movements being driven by self-reinforcing momenta affected by imperfect information or herd responses. Vayanos and Woolley, An Institutional Theory of Momentum and Reversal (November 2008) LSE Paper; (c) individual behaviour may not be rational in all cases and driven by instinct or herd effects. Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Bias (1982); (d) allocative efficiency benefits may be limited with diminishing benefits having to be considered against the increased risk of instability; and (e) market prices may diverge substantially from economic values over time partly as a result of herd effects or market overshooting with prices becoming irrational. Shiller, Irrational Exuberance. Turner (n) 40-41.
^149	  	Securitisation has realised substantial benefits in terms of increased liquidity and risk diversification although difficulties arise with regard to increased market volatility of securitised bond and note prices, the additional economic damage caused by collapses in debt rather than credit instruments, leveraging effects of bank rather than equity disturbances and an overall increase in potential systemic risk. Turner (n) 42-43.
^150	  	VAR related risk management models have been criticised for the use of short observation periods, failure to take into account non-normal distributions and network effects as well as more significant inability to predict future events from past price patterns. Turner (n) 44-45. The models did not fail to predict recent events (such as the freezing of the inter-bank markets) but attached exceptionally low probability scores despite their significantly damaging effects (fat-tail distributions). Benoit Mandelbrot, The Misbehaviour of Markets (2004) and Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (2007). The models also failed to take into account the effects of ‘network externalities’, ‘disaster myopia’ and ‘misaligned incentives’. Andrew Haldane, Why Banks Failed the Stress Test (February 2009). It is also arguable that mathematical modelling cannot simply be applied to social and economic relations. Frank Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921).
^151	  	Market discipline may be considered to have failed in a number of respects during the recent crisis. This includes: (a) the failure of bank CDS prices to reflect
^152	  	Turner (n 146).
^153	  	It is arguable that the FSMA should have expressly referred to financial stability rather than market confidence. Financial stability can nevertheless be considered to be a shared responsibility between the FSA (under the FSMA), the Bank of England (under the Bank of England Act 1998 as amended by the Banking Act 2009) and the Treasury. A distinction also has to be drawn between regulatory objectives and underlying justifications for regulatory intervention. Subsection
^154	  	Uncertainty was highlighted in the Turner Review (n 146). Mandelbrot, Taleb and Haldane (n 150).
^155	  	Sub-section 6.
^156	  	Sub-section 8.
^157	  	The term objective can then be used in a number of ways. Regulatory objectives can be understood to refer initially to the justifications or rationale for financial regulation which are referred to as regulator theories in this text (Sub-section 6). This may either include more general justificatory arguments (such as public interest, public choice or market correction) or more specific instances of market failure (such as systemic instability, monopolies, information asymmetry, consumer protection or uncertainty or network effects). Objectives can be more correctly used to refer to the particular primary functions or mandate of the regulatory agency and the targeted results  it is require or intended to achieve (such as protect financial stability and protect depositors). Other more ancillary and potentially conflicting objectives or sub-objectives may also be imposed (such as maintaining market confidence, consumer awareness, financial capability, financial efficiency and financial competition). The term may less accurately used to refer to other more general financial policy areas or targets (including competition policy, financial crime or monetary policy and economic or fiscal policy as well as consumer protection more generally).  The term may also be confused with other more specific tools or obligations including capital, liquidity or suitability regulation or systems and controls or financial sanctions.
^158	  	Objectives and principles can be distinguished in that principles are concerned with the obligations at regulated institutions must comply with rather than with the functions of the regulatory agencies although the terms may be used inter-changeably at times and can overlap. Sub-section 10(d)(iii).
^159	  	(n 157).
^160	  	The statutory objectives for the FSA are imposed under s2(2) of the FSMA and the more ancillary principles under s2(3) FSMA. (n).
^161	  	Financial confidence is imposed as a regulatory objective under s2(2)(a) of the FSMA with the term being expanded in s3 to mean maintaining confidence in the financial system with the financial system including financial markets and exchanges, regulated activities and other activities connected with financial markets and exchanges.
^162	  	The FSA is to have regard to the responsibilities of those who manage the affairs of authorised persons under s3(b) FSMA. 
^163	  	The FSA is to have regard to the principle that a burden or restriction imposed should be proportionate to the benefits in general terms expected to result under s2(2)(c) FSMA.
^164	  	Public awareness is imposed as a regulatory objective under s2(2)(b) FSMA with public awareness being to promote public understanding of the financial system including the benefits and risks associated with different kinds of investment or other financial dealing and the provision of information and advice under s4 FSMA. This has been extended by the FSA to create a general ‘Financial Capability’ programme to educate consumers as to the benefits and risks of using financial services. Walker, ‘Financial Services Authority’ in Blair and Walker (n) ch.1, paras.
^165	  	The FSA is required to minimise any adverse effects or competition arising from discharge of its functions under s2(3)(f) FSMA. This may be understood to constitute a general financial damage test. This is part of regulatory and competition policy.
^166	  	The FSA is required to use its resources in the most efficient and economic way under s2(3)(a) FSMA. This can be understood as a general efficiency requirement and forms part both of regulatory and economic policy. 
^167	  	The FSA is required to maintain the competitive position of UK markets and to facilitate competition between regulated institutions under s2(3)(e) and (g) FSMA. This constitutes a general competition test part of competition policy.
^168	  	The FSA is required to facilitate innovation in connection with regulated activities under s2(3)(d) FSMA. This is part of regulatory and economic policy. 
^169	  	One of the FSA’s regulatory objectives is reducing financial crime under s2(2)(d) FSMA with financial crime extended to include fraud or dishonesty, misconduct or misuse of information relating to financial markets and handling the proceeds of crime (money laundering) under s6 FSMA.
^170	  	Conduct may include misconduct or information abuse under the extended definition of financial crime in s6(3)(b) FSMA although this will also include holding general high standards of conduct under the FSA’s Handbook of Rules and Guidance imposed under ss138 and 157 FSMA. This specifically contains eleven High Level Principles as well as systems and control requirements (SYSC) and provisions for approved persons (APER and FIT).
^171	  	The FSA has generally attempted to promote highest ethical standards within the financial services industry although it is difficult to regulate for this specifically. See FSA, Ethics discussion paper
^172	  	The FSA has become concerned most recently with whether financial innovation produces any external welfare benefits or simply generates income and rent extraction for financial firms. Turner Review (n) para.
^173	  	Section 5.
^174	  	Llewellyn refers to the importance of expectation in designing regulatory systems. (n).
^175	  	The FSA is only required to ‘act in a way’ and ‘so far as is reasonably possible’ that is ‘compatible’ with the regulatory objectives (s2(2)) with the FSA being given a further express power to determine the way which it considers ‘most appropriate for the purpose of meeting those objectives’. s2(1) FSMA. The FSA is then only more generally to ‘have regard to’ the other standards or principles under s2(3) in discharging its general functions. s2(3). For comment, Walker 
^176	  Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Right Hon. George Osborne MP, “Speech at the Lord Mayor’s Dinner for Bankers & Merchants of the City of London at Mansion House” (16 June 2010). 
^177	  	Section 10.
^178	  	Consumer protection policy is concerned with ensuring that the interests of the general public in any particular country or larger region (such as the EU)  are safeguarded in so far as possible. This will often include small and medium sized business parties although not larger corporate entities.     
^179	  	Competition policy is concerned with ensuring that busuness entities do not unfairly interfere with market operations either through abusive agreements, dominat market positions or mergers or acquaisiont that would create  a dominat position.     
^180	  	Criminal policy is concerned with the revision and enforcement of criminal laws against all parties committing any breach  subject to any available defences.
^181	  	Monetary policy is concerned with the management of the amount and cost of money or credit in circulation within the economy.  
^182	  	Economic policy refers to the areas of management of the economy through government action including in connection with industrial and ted matters.
^183	  	Fiscal policy is concerned with the collection, allocation and distribution of government cash or income other monetary receipts  
^184	  	Sub-section 7(e) (nn).
^185	  	Sub-section 8(e).
^186	  	Turner Report (n 146) para .
^187	  	Sub-section 7. While the European continent has generally followed an institutional approach (being dominated by large ‘universal banks’ that can undertake banking and securities as well as other financial activities), the US and UK have adopted a functional model with the difference between the US and UK being that a significant degree of sector separation  is imposed by law in the US whereas this has simply arisen arisen out of market practice in the UK. Walker (n 1) ch3. See also, Roberta S. Karmel, Functional Regulation (1985), 501, PLL CORP 9, 9; and Melanie L. Fein, 'Functional Regulation: A Concept for Glass-Steagall Reform?' 2 Stan J.L. Bus & Fin., 89 (1995). 
^188	  	See generally, Charles Goodhart and Dirk Schoemacker, Institutional Separation Between Supervisory and Monetary Agencies (April 1993) Financial Markets Group.
^189	  	See generally, Blair, Walker and Purves, Financial Services Law (n 2).
^190	  “Osborne retains right to veto Bank” Financial Times (18 June 2010) 3.
^191	  	See Charles A. E. Goodhart, Philipp Hartmann, David T. Llewellyn, Liliana Rojas-Suarez and Steven R. Weisbrod, Financial Regulation: Why, How and Where Now? (6 June 1997), Monograph for the Central Bank Governors' Meeting, Banking of England; Clive Briault, The Rationale for a Single National Financial Services Regulator (May 1999), FSA Occasional Paper, section 5; UK Financial Supervision: A Blueprint for Change (May 1994), Central for the Study of Financial Innovation; Michael Taylor, Twin Peaks: A regulatory structure for the new century (December 1995); and Taylor, Peak Practice: How to Reform the UK's Regulatory System (October 1996).  See also Taylor, Regulatory Leviathan: Will Super-SSIB Work? (1997). See also House of  Commons Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee, The Regulatory of Financial Services in the UK (November 1995). 
^192	  	This would require setting up a separate ‘Financial Stability Commission’ (FSC) and a ‘Consumer Protection Commission’ (CPC). This model was adopted in Australia after the Wallis Commission Report with the new Australian Prudential Regulation Commission (APRC) and Corporations and Financial Services Commission (CFSC) although there was also  a separate financial stability agency with the Reserve Bank  and with a competition authority.  Wallis Committee, Prudential Supervision and Monetary Policy (1997). Taylor also accepts that a third 'peak' may also be established with a ‘Market Surveillance Agency’ (MSA). Taylor, Twin Peaks (n 189) 14.
^193	 	This may include creating a separate: (a) single systemic regulator; b) prudential regulator for securities firms, insurance companies and other non-bank institutions (where solvency remains an important issue); (c) a single conduct of business regulator for retail financial business; (d) a separate conduct of business regulator for wholesale business; (e) a self-regulatory (or alternative) system for markets and exchanges; and (f) an independent competition agency (although not necessarily a specialist agency only dealing with financial services area).  See Goodhart et.al (n 189) 19.	
^194	  	Section 7.
^195	  (nn).
^196	  This creates a “Five Peak” or, possibly more accurately, “Four and a Half Peak” model.
^197	  Stock market and exchange oversight, business conduct and enforcement arguably still have systemic implications and especially with regard to market oversight. Appropriate co-operation mechanisms will still have to be maintained between the relevant agencies.
^198	  	Section 7.
^199	  	Section 9.
^200	  	A full authorisation or licensing obligation may be imposed requiring application and compliance with specific conditions or criteria and the issuance of a formal certificate of compliance. This applies with regard to regulated institutions under the UK FSMA with the general conditions being set out in Schedule 6 FSMA and COND within the FSA Handbook.
^201	  	A permission obligation may be imposed on specific activities in addition to the general authorisation regime. This is provided for under s20 FSMA with financial institutions being required to hold authorisation as well as permission to carry on particular regulated activities as set out in Schedule 2 FSMA and the Regulated Activities Order RAO. Under such a combined system, authorisation can be understood as a more general condition to carry on a controlled activity generally with permission applying to specific types of activity. Walker (n 2).
^202	  	A simpler approval or recognition system may be used based on less strict criteria such as, for example, without the need to maintain high minimum initial capital requirements or ongoing capital and liquidity reserves. An approval system is applied with regard to individuals carrying on controlled functions under s59 FSMA and APER within the FSA Handbook. A separate recognition system is applied with regard investment exchanges and clearing houses under Part XVIII FSMA.
^203	  	Registration simply requires entities applying to be included on an official list of some form to allow for public disclosure. Conditions or criteria of varying degree may be imposed under the particular system although this may not always be considered necessary.
^204	  	The simplest model would operate on a notification only basis. Parties would have the right to carry on the particular activity following notification alone unless some right of veto or removal was granted to the regulatory agencies. This, for example, applies with regard to home state authorised EU firms wishing to carry on regulated activities in the UK under Schedule 3 and 4 FSMA. Such institutions are already authorised under EU financial directives or the EU Treaty directly. Walker (n 2).
^205	  	Sub-section 10(b).
^206	  	The FSMA provides for general rules under s138 as well as other price stabilising rules (s144), financial promotion rules (s145), money laundering rules (s145) and information control rules (s147). The FSA may also endorse other codes such as the City Panel on Takeovers under s143 FSMA.  Walker (n 2).
^207	  	These include efficiency and economy, management responsibility, proportionality, innovation, international character and competition. s2(3) FSMA.   
^208	 	These consist of : (a) integrity; (b) skill, care and diligence; (c) management and control; (d) financial prudence; (e) market conduct; (f) customer’s interest; (g) communications with clients; (h) conflicts of interest; (i) customers relationships of trust; (j) clients’ assets; and (k) relations with regulators. FSA PRIN. 
^209	  	The UK FSA’s general functions are defined to include determining the general policy and principles by reference to which it performs particular functions (s2(4)(d)). The FSA also has an express power to issue ‘statements of principle’ with regard to the conduct of approved persons under s64. The system is nevertheless designed to operate on a delegated rules basis with the FSA having no express legal authority to operate and enforce on a solely principles basis.
^210	  	Walker (n 2) ch 1 paras 1.124-126. See, for example, FSA, ‘Principles-Based Regulation – Focusing on the Outcomes that Matter’ (April 2007).
^211	  	Section 7.
^212	  	See, for example, Hector Sants, ‘Principles Based Regulation – Lessons from the Sub-Prime Crisis’ (15 May 2008).
^213	  	Walker (n 1).
^214	  	(n 36).
^215	  	Sub-section 10(c).
^216	  	Adequate resources (including capital) and suitability obligations are imposed under paras.4 and 5 of Schedule 6 FSMA while legal status, location of offices and close links are also dealt with under paras.1, 2 and 3. Systems and controls were formerly included under the Schedule 3 criteria imposed on banks under the Banking Act 1987 (Schedule 3) although these have since been transferred to the High Level Standards including PRIN and SYSC. Walker (n 2) ch 15.
^217	  	All EU Member States are required to maintain an adequate enforcement system under the Banking Consolidation Directive Art 54 in addition to the preventing any institution from carrying on a deposit-taking activity without authorisation under the Directive (the general prohibition) under art 5. Walker, European Banking Law – Policy and Programme Construction (BICCL London 2006).
^218	  	ss 380-381 and 382-386 FSMA.
^219	  	Complaints against regulated institutions in the UK are dealt with under DISP and complaints against the FSA under COAF under the FSA Handbook. Compensation including deposit protection is dealt with under COMP as amended by the provisions contained in the Banking Act 2009. 
^220	  	Walker, ‘Banking Act 2009’ Informa FRR (2009).
^221	  	Revised Conduct of Business (COBS) provisions were adopted following the coming into effect of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MIFID) in the UK. Walker (n212).
^222	  	The offences now apply with regard to insider dealing (s118(2)), improper disclosure (s118(3)), misuse of information (s118(4)), manipulating transactions (s118(5)), manipulating devices (s118(6), dissemination (s118(7)) and misleading behaviour (s118(8)).
^223	  	Part VIII FSMA. For comment, Jonathan Melrose, ‘Market Abuse’ in Blair and Walker (n) ch. . See also Walker, ‘Market Abuse’ in Blair, Walker and others, Blackstones’ Guide to the Financial Services and Markets Act (2000) ch 10. 
^224	  	Walker, ‘Listing’ in Blair, Walker and others (n 218) ch 8. 
^225	  	Walker, ‘Markets and Exchanges’ in Blair and Walker, Markets and Exchanges Law (OUP Oxford 2007) (n 7) ch1.
^226	  	The ICMA was set up with the merger of the earlier International Primary Markets Association (IPMA) and the International Secondary Markets Association (ISMA). The main rules are still referred to as the ‘IPMA handbook’ on the ICMA website http://www.icma.org/. 
^227	  	Sub-section 10(c) and (n 197).
^228	 	Sub-section 1(c).
^229	  	Sub-section 6(b).  
^230	  	Disclosure is an essential regulatory tool although this does not necessarily require the pre-approval and vetting of all disclosed documents by official authorities. The imposition of specific controls on such matters as price ceilings or return rates may only benefit the regulatory industry at the expense of the consumer while market entry restrictions more generally close-up markets for the benefit of existing service providers. The adoption of improvements in specific regulatory controls such as capital adequacy should not mean that all of the existing capital regulations are maintained at the same time as the new controls imposed. Regulatory reform should be progressive and balanced and not simply cumulative and distortive. Sub-section (11)(5).   	
^231	  	Sub-section 10(e).
^232	  	Turner Report.
^233	  	(n 36).
^234	  	Walker (n 2) ch 15.
^235	  	Walker
^236	  	These included IPRU (Bank), IPRU (IMV) (Securities), IPRU (INS) (Insurance), IPRU (FS) (Friendly Societies) and IPRU (BS) (Building Societies). Walker (n 2) ch 15.
^237	  	Walker (n 2) ch 15.
^238	  	Walker (n 2) ch 15.
^239	  	Sub-section 10(d).
^240	  	Walker (n 2) ch 1 paras 1.127-131. See also FSA, Better Regulation Action Plan (December 2005); FSA, Better Regulation Action Plan Progress Report (June 2006); and FSA and the Office of Fair Trading, Delivering Better Regulatory Outcomes – May 2008 Update (May 2008).
